Resumen Este artículo examina siete concepciones filosóficas acerca de la libertad -incluyendo la distinción entre libertad negativa y positiva, liberal y republicana-, ejemplificándolas con representantes de la historia de la filosofía. Por otra parte, para enriquecer la mirada desde un texto jurídico concreto, examinamos la Constitución ecuatoriana de 2008. El propósito principal que ha animado esta investigación es el de sondear las distintas visiones que se han propuesto sobre la libertad, en su triple relación con: 1) los valores, tales como (...) el bien común y la igualdad; 2) el tipo de deber correspondiente que tienen que cumplir los particulares y la sociedad con respecto al sujeto portador del derecho a la libertad; y 3) el Estado y las leyes. Aspiramos a que los resultados alcanzados aporten mayor claridad en aquellos debates de la filosofía normativa en los que está involucrada la libertad.The paper examines seven philosophical conceptions of freedom -including the distinctions between positive and negative liberty, and liberal and republican liberty-, exemplifying them with great authors in the history of philosophy. On the other hand, in order to enrich the vision with a concrete legal document, we examine the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008. The central aim of the research is to probe the use made by those who participated in the drafting of that Constitution of philosophical ideas concerning liberty in its threefold relation to: 1) values, such as common good and equality; 2) the correlative duties imposed on individuals and the society at large with respect to the holder of the right to freedom; and 3) the state and its laws. We hope that the results provide greater clarity in those debates of normative philosophy in which freedom is involved. (shrink)

‘Epistocracy’ is the name of a type of political power structure in which the power is held by the knowledgable—for example, by restricting the right to vote to those who can demonstrate sufficient knowledge. Though Plato and Mill defended epistocratic views, it has found few contemporary advocates. In a recent book, however, Jason Brennan argues that epistocratic power structures are capable of outperforming democratic ones. His argument is two-pronged: first, he argues that democratic procedures with universal suffrage allow poorly-informed voters (...) to pollute the electorate, and that doing so has negative policy-related consequences that are easily avoidable. Second, he argues that voting does not possess any non-intrinsic value, and so restricting suffrage to the educated does not result in a loss of status or standing for less well-educated persons in any meaningful way. I argue that epistocratic techniques are impossible to implement fairly, and represent an ineffective solution for the problems they are designed to solve. On these bases, I recommend rejecting it. (shrink)

What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of (...) Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so? (shrink)

In Why Not Socialism ?, G. A. Cohen argues that market society and capitalism are intrinsically repugnant. He asks us to imagine an ideal camping trip, which becomes increasing repugnant as it shifts from living by socialist to capitalist principles. In this paper, I expose the limits of this style of argument by making a parallel argument, which shows how an ideal anarchist camping trip becomes increasingly repugnant as the campsite turns from anarchism to democracy. When we see why this (...) style of argument fails to generate interesting objections to democracy, we then see why it also fails to generate interesting objections to market society. (shrink)

According to the commonsense view of civic virtue, the places to exercise civic virtue are largely restricted to politics. In this article, I argue for a more expansive view of civic virtue, and argue that one can exercise civic virtue equally well through working for or running a for-profit business. I argue that this conclusion follows from four relatively uncontroversial premises: (1) the consensus definition of “civic virtue”, (2) the standard, most popular theory of virtuous activity, (3) a conception of (...) the common good widely shared by liberal political philosophers, and (4) the mainstream economic theory of for-profit business. (shrink)