In this paper, I develop a phenomenological description of lived autonomy and describe possible alterations of lived autonomy associated with chronic depression as they relate to specific psychopathological symptoms. I will distinguish between two types of lived autonomy, a pre-reflective type and a reflective type, which differ with respect to the explicitness of the action that is willed into existence; and I will relate these types to the classical distinction between freedom of intentional action and freedom of the will. I (...) will then describe how a chronically depressed person habitually discloses her experiential workspace with an impaired scope of perceivable action-properties, and pre-reflectively values many of these perceived action-properties as demanding or devalues these properties as well as her own abilities and drive to perform the respective actions. These alterations, typically experienced in a passive manner, imply an impairment of both types of lived autonomy. Drawing on first-hand accounts, I will then argue that small islands of lived autonomy, even of the reflective type, are possible if the afflicted identifies with at least some of her ‘depressive disabilities’. Lastly, I will compare this manner of life-conduct with the constellation of includence, as described by Tellenbach, and discuss the limitations of this study. (shrink)

In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type. Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced self-determination when acting on delusions. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that a person with delusions can (...) be described as responsible for her behaviour on a ‘framed’ level (level of freedom of intentional action), even though she is not autonomous on a higher (‘framing’) level (level of freedom of the will), if, and only if, the goods of agency for herself and others are respected. In these cases the person with delusions is very nearly comparable to people in love, who are also not free to choose their convictions, and who could also be rightly held responsible for the behaviour flowing from their convictions. (shrink)

The suicide experience combines despair with the perception of suicide as the last option to alter its suffering effectively and actively. Shneidman’s phenomenology understands the suicidal mind in terms of psychological pain, as opposed to focusing on the individual context. This article aims to meet and review information from articles and books published in the area of the Phenomenology of Suicide, mostly between 2017 and 2021. By integrating and relating the different philosophical perspectives of the patient, his or her family, (...) and the mental health worker, it is intended to identify emotions that are common to different groups affected by suicide, regardless of the context, experiences, and means used to commit suicide. The phenomenological description of self-determination experienced in suicide helps to improve the understanding of the suicidal mind, which can be useful in understanding questions that relate to issues such as assisted suicide and suicide prevention. The management of post-suicide consequences, especially the stigma, a cross-cutting challenge for all these groups, benefits from the specialized support of health professionals, either through psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy or support groups. (shrink)