Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramāṇa—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsaṅgika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramāṇa (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsaṅgika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramāṇa in the Prāsaṅgika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika’s epistemology, and (...) by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsaṅgika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed. (shrink)

This paper challenges the notion that there is a complete continuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and the thought of Candrakīrti. It is shown that there is strong reason to doubt Candrakīrti’s gloss of Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK) 2.1, and that Candrakīrti’s peculiar reading of this verse causes him to alter the context of the discussion in the four cases in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 later in the text—MMK 3.3, 7.14, 10.13 and 16.7. The innovation produced by Candrakīrti is next contrasted (...) to Nāgārjuna’s style of argument, and it is shown that these two author’s notions of emptiness, as well as their particular implementation of Madhyamaka logic, significantly diverge from each other. Finally, Candrakīrti’s reading of these verses is compared with his commentary on MMK 15 so as to suggest a possible subtle metaphysical position that is at the base of his thinking. (shrink)

I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarāśi. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem (...) remains a serious issue with which those sympathetic to Dignāga ought to contend. (shrink)

The paper aims to determine the identity of an unnamed opponent in a passage of the first chapter of the Prasannapadā whose school affiliation eluded traditional Tibetan scholars and is disputed by modern scholars. The individual(s) in question, whose fundamental ontological views are made evident in the passage’s opening objection as presented by Candrakīrti, has/have alternatively been identified as the Mādhyamika Bhāviveka, as representatives of the Naiyāyika school and, following Stcherbatsky, as Dignāga and/or later members of his epistemological-logical tradition. Although (...) textual evidence adduced by authors of recent publications has been viewed as supportive of the hypothesis that the interlocutor is Dignāga, the general nature of this evidence and awareness of Dignāga’s ontological presuppositions suggest that the matter requires reconsideration. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the connections between meta-ontological and meta-philosophical issues in two of Nāgārjuna’s primary works, the Mūlamadhyamakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī. I argue for an interpretative framework that places Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as a meta- and ultimately non-philosophical evaluation of philosophy. The paper’s primary argument is that an interpretative framework which makes explicit the meta-ontological and meta-philosophical links in Nāgārjuna’s thought is both viable and informative. Following Nāgārjuna, I start my analysis by looking at the positions that exist within (...) the ontological debate and show that the Mādhyamika should be understood as an ontological deflationist who aims to discredit ontological questions altogether. I argue, however, that the Mādhyamika does not wish to engage in meta-ontological debates either and that Nāgārjuna’s ontological deflationist arguments necessarily lead to a position of philosophical deflationism: the rejection of all philosophical and meta-philosophical debates. Further on, I provide a sketch of denegation, the language operator in Madhyamaka that allows Nāgārjuna to make seemingly philosophical claims while not having the commitments that traditional philosophical claims do. I conclude with a defense of my interpretation of Madhyamaka as weak philosophical deflationism compared to other deflationist construals, an explicit discussion of the ways in which my understanding differs from contemporary western interpretations that prima facie resemble weak philosophical deflationism, and an identification of weak philosophical deflationism with dequitism, a variant of quetism. (shrink)

The Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, the followers of which are called Mādhyamikas, was one of the two principal schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, the other school being the Yogācāra. The name of the school is a reference to the claim made of Buddhism in general that it is a middle path (madhyamā pratipad) that avoids the two extremes of eternalism—the doctrine that all things exist because of an eternal essence—and annihilationism—the doctrine that things have essences while they exist but (...) that these essences are annihilated just when the things themselves go out of existence. The conviction of the Madhyamaka school, which can be called the Centrist school in English, is that this middle path is best achieved by a denial that things have any inherent natures at all. All things are, in other words, empty of inherent natures. This doctrine of universal emptiness of inherent natures (svabhāva-śūnyatā) is the hallmark of the school, which places the school solidly in the tradition associated with the Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (shrink)