Some say that consent is essentially just a state of mind. Others say it is essentially just a communication. Many say it is both. I say it is neither. Instead it is an act, or rather a pair of acts—an internal mental act in the first instance, an external performative act in the second. Each of those acts is an act of commitment, intrapersonally in the first case and interpersonally in the second. The content of the commitment is, familiarly enough, (...) to give permission to someone else to do something that it would be wrong for them to do without your permission. The novelty lies in seeing consent as an act of commitment in those two dimensions and in seeing those as commitments that persist until and unless undone by an act of a similar sort. (shrink)

Marketisation is rife in higher education. Asymmetries between consumers and producers in markets result in inefficiencies. To address imbalances, policy-makers pushing higher education towards a market model have a tendency to increase the market power of the student by increasing information or amplifying voice. One such policy in England is called ‘students as partners.’ However, I argue here that student partnership can easily undermine relations of authority and trust between students and academic teachers.

How does the voice–silence dynamics affect the durability of authoritarian regimes? This article reformulates Hirschman’s voice, loyalty, exit model to answer this question. It demonstrates that the model’s heuristic value is significantly hampered by conceptual imprecision around the category of voice, a narrow understanding of exit, and – in particular – the neglect of the category of silence. Once these categories are conceptually reworked, and silence is placed next to voice and exit – as a core concept, not a residual (...) category, in the model – the ‘dictator’s dilemma’ emerges as a ‘silence paradox’ hinting at some of authoritarianism’s main vulnerabilities. The case of China is used to illustrate the article’s key theoretical-conceptual advancements. (shrink)

Deploying a broadly interpretive approach, the article explores the extent to which, and the ways in which, equality is enacted in non-elective as well as elective representation. It argues that the fleeting and fragmentary equalities evident in non-elective representation are democratically significant, and that examining them can enhance understanding of the democratic promise and limits of different modes of representation.

Though genuine (voluntary, deliberate) consent of the governed does not occur in modern states, political legitimacy still requires something that does what consent does. Dereification of the state (recognizing that citizens continually create their state), combined with a defensible notion of moral responsibility, entails citizens' moral responsibility for their state. This implies that we may treat citizens morally as if they consented to their state, yielding a moral equivalent of consent of the governed, and a conception of political legitimacy applicable (...) to modern states thought legitimate. It implies that legitimate states have a moral right to rule, and their citizens have a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law. (shrink)

Aunque el uso no problematizado en el lenguaje ordinario de los términos "consenso" y "consentimiento" sugiere que debe haber alguna comprensión compartida de su significado, no hay un acuerdo generalizado sobre el uso de estos conceptos entre los filósofos políticos. De hecho, el significado filosófico de estos conceptos sigue siendo elusivo y controvertido; tal vez precisamente a causa de su amplitud y centralidad. Teniendo en cuenta los numerosos intentos de explicar satisfactoriamente consenso y consentimiento -que con el tiempo se han (...) vuelto más sofisticados-, este artículo recoge algunos usos filosóficos fundamentales de estos dos multifacéticos conceptos y sugiere una estrategia para bosquejar un mapa que parece un rompecabezas cuyas piezas están moldeadas de tal forma que se necesita un enfoque multidisciplinario para poder identificar adecuadamente sus significados e implicaciones. Although the unproblematic use of the terms "consensus" and "consent" in ordinary language suggests that there must be some shared understanding of their meaning, there is no widespread assent on the use of these concepts among political philosophers. In fact, the philosophical meaning of these concepts remains elusive and controversial, perhaps exactly because of their extension and centrality. Taking note of the numerous attempts to provide a satisfactory account of "consensus" and "consent" - that have become increasingly sophisticated in time - this article recollects some fundamental philosophical uses of the two many-faceted concepts, and suggests a strategy for delineating a map that looks like a puzzle, whose pieces are shaped in such a way that we need a multidisciplinary approach in order to adequately identify their meanings and implications. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that parents have special duties toward their children—weightier duties than they owe other children. How these duties are acquired, however, is not well understood. This is problematic when claims about parental responsibilities are challenged; for example, when people deny that they are morally responsible for their biological offspring. In this paper I present a theory of the origins of parental responsibilities that can resolve such cases of disputed moral parenthood.

I argue against various versions of the ‘attitude’ view of consent and of the ‘action’ view of consent: I show that neither an attitude nor an action is either necessary or sufficient for consent. I then put forward a different view of consent based on the idea that, given a legitimate epistemic context, absence of dissent is sufficient for consent: what is crucial is having access to dissent. In the latter part of the paper I illustrate my view of consent (...) by applying it to the case of consenting to being an organ donor. (shrink)

One of the most common arguments in favour of the state's authority is that without the coordinating hand of political institutions, we could not achieve important moral benefits. I argue that if we understand authority correctly, then coordination cannot even in principle establish that coordinators have political authority.

This paper extends Alan John Simmons?s conceptual distinction between Lockean and Kantian conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their (...) respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons?s main criticism. (shrink)

Works of art can be difficult in several ways. One important way is by making us face up to unsettling truths. Such works typically receive praise. I maintain, however, that sometimes they deserve moral censure. The crux of my argument is that, just as we have a right to know the truth in certain contexts, so too we have a right not to know it. Provided our ignorance does not harm or seriously endanger others, the decision about whether to know (...) the truth ought to be left to us. Within this limit, therefore, difficult art is morally problematic if it intentionally targets those who have chosen not to know. To illustrate the problem, I discuss the literary writings of Søren Kierkegaard, which aim to deceive readers into seeing unpleasant truths about themselves that they seek to ignore. (shrink)

Some argue that if an agent intentionally participates in collective wrongdoing, that agent bears responsibility for contributing actions performed by other members of the agent’s collective. Some of these intention-state theorists distribute co-responsibility to group members by appeal to participatory intentions alone, while others require participants to instantiate additional beliefs or perform additional actions. I argue that prominent intention-state theories of co-responsibility fail to provide a compelling rationale for why participation in collective wrongdoing merits responsibility not only for one’s own (...) actions but the contributing actions of others as well. I propose that authorization agreements provide us with a suitable rationale. Authorization may be expressly given, as when one person signs a document authorizing another to advance her aims. Or, authorization may be tacitly or implicitly given by participating in and sufficiently contributing to a common plan. If a person authorizes an agent to act, it is right to blame the authorizer for what the agent does on the authorizer’s behalf. An authorization theory justifies the distribution of co-responsibility by appeal to the morally transformative power of agreement, thereby providing a compelling rationale for why a person may be to blame for contributing actions performed by other agents. (shrink)

Some argue that if an agent intentionally participates in collective wrongdoing, that agent bears responsibility for contributing actions performed by other members of the agent’s collective. Some of these intention-state theorists distribute co-responsibility to group members by appeal to participatory intentions alone, while others require participants to instantiate additional beliefs or perform additional actions. I argue that prominent intention-state theories of co-responsibility fail to provide a compelling rationale for why participation in collective wrongdoing merits responsibility not only for one’s own (...) actions but the contributing actions of others as well. I propose that authorization agreements provide us with a suitable rationale. Authorization may be expressly given, as when one person signs a document authorizing another to advance her aims. Or, authorization may be tacitly or implicitly given by participating in and sufficiently contributing to a common plan. If a person authorizes an agent to act, it is right to blame the authorizer for what the agent does on the authorizer’s behalf. An authorization theory justifies the distribution of co-responsibility by appeal to the morally transformative power of agreement, thereby providing a compelling rationale for why a person may be to blame for contributing actions performed by other agents. (shrink)

Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves and have moral powers to acquire property rights in external things under certain conditions. It is normally advocated as a theory of justice in the sense of the duties that we owe each other. So understood, it is silent about any impersonal duties (i.e., duties owed to no one) that we may have.

Political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and of the decisions—about laws, policies, and candidates for political office—made within them. This entry will survey the main answers that have been given to the following questions. First, how should legitimacy be defined? Is it primarily a descriptive or a normative concept? If legitimacy is understood normatively, what does it entail? Some associate legitimacy with the justification of coercive power and with the creation of political authority. Others associate it with the (...) justification, or at least the sanctioning, of existing political authority. Authority stands for a right to rule—a right to issue commands and, possibly, to enforce these commands using coercive power. An additional question is whether legitimate political authority is understood to entail political obligations or not. Most people probably think it does. But some think that the moral obligation to obey political authority can be separated from an account of legitimate authority, or at least that such obligations arise only if further conditions hold. (shrink)

This paper contests a point that Jacques Derrida and John Searle actually agree on, within their infamous debate: that a sign must be repeatable. I focus on a situation involving dissent when evaluating this claim.

Let justice be a feature of the social order imposed by a state and legitimacy a feature of how it is imposed: one that makes the imposition acceptable. This article argues that, so understood, legitimacy is quite a distinct concern from justice; that the core concern is with showing how state coercion is consistent with people’s being free citizens; that this does not require showing that the state exists by consensus or contract; that the best hope of satisfying the concern (...) lies with arguing that state coercion need not be dominating; and that this is possible only within the republican theory that identifies freedom with the absence of domination, not interference. (shrink)

Among those who reject the Epicurean claim that death is not bad for the one who dies, it is popularly held that death is bad for the one who dies, when it is bad for the one who dies, because it deprives the one who dies of the good things that otherwise would have fallen into her life. This view is known as the deprivation account of the value of death, and Fred Feldman is one of its most prominent defenders. (...) In this paper, I explain why I believe that Feldman’s argument for the occasional badness of death fails. While staying within an Epicurean framework, I offer an alternative that adequately accounts for a significant range of widely held intuitions about prudential value. My account implies that death is almost always good for the one who dies, yet often less good than not dying. Finally, I discuss some puzzles that remain for my account and hint at possible ways to address them. (shrink)

After elaborating the idea of liminality and briefing defending an understanding of representation as practice, the chapter will focus on four distinctions often deployed to divide up and map conceptually the field of political representation. Representation’s liminal character presses us to question the neatness and the realism of many such distinctions. For each of the four distinctions I focus on the transitional or intermediate nature of representation, and the consequences that follow for theoretical analysis. Finally, I show how these four (...) contribute to a larger and more encompassing distinction between representative democracy and democratic representation, arguing that the former –often the sole focus of debates on representation –is one part of the latter. (shrink)

Some political philosophers have judged that it is absurd to think that there can be unintentional consent. In this paper, I present an example of unintentional consent, which I refer to as the adapted boardroom example. I consider reasons for denying that this is an example of unintentional consent, but find that these reasons are unconvincing.