This article models legal interpretation through argumentation and provides a logical analysis of interpretive arguments, their conflicts, and the resulting indeterminacies. Interpretive arguments are modelled as defeasible inferences, which can be challenged and defeated by counterarguments and be reinstated through further arguments. It is shown what claims are possibly (defensibly) or necessarily (justifiably) supported by the arguments constructible from a given interpretive basis, i.e., a set of interpretive canons coupled with reasons for their application. It is finally established under what (...) conditions such arguments provide single outcomes or rather support alternative interpretive conclusions, thus leading to propositions of law whose truth‐value is undetermined. (shrink)

The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This essay aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. First, the most widespread definition of legal defeasibility is examined and criticized. The essay shows that such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. Second, this essay argues that no new definition is needed. I will (...) show that from an interpretative standpoint, there is nothing special about legal defeasibility. Contrary to what some authors maintain, no unique or privileged source of legal defeasibility exists, nor are there privileged arguments to justify it. Specifically, legal defeasibility refers to interpretative outcomes deriving from interpretative arguments that, on the one hand, are very different from one another, and, on the other, are often employed to justify different interpretative outcomes. In the legal field, the problems related to defeasibility have little in common with the problems that this label covers in other areas—such as logic or epistemology—and they are nothing but the well-known problems related to legal interpretation. In conclusion, this paper argues that as far as legal argumentation is concerned, the notion of legal defeasibility lacks explanatory power, and it should be abandoned. (shrink)

There are certain standards of legal interpretation. Interpretive directives are heterogeneous—both in terms of the issues they address and of the form. Not all authors consider the canons of interpretation to be norms like any other ones. Moreover, some claim that the term “incorrect interpretation” refers only to an arbitrarily chosen concept. I intend to investigate whether, despite the objections raised, interpretative directives can be said to have the status of legal norms. I wonder whether the so-called law of interpretation (...) (LoI), can provide a normative key to assess the correctness of the interpretation of legal texts. Text raises important questions concerning LoI. Firstly, the question of the status of interpretative directives and the problem of their defeasibility. Second, it refers to the problem of compliance with interpretative directives and the consequences of their violation, drawing attention to the two contexts of legal interpretation (the context of discovery and justification) and to the fact that canons of interpretation can constitute a standard for the correctness of the interpretative procedure and for its result. Third, this paper refers to the problem of vagueness of interpretative directives, analysing the advantages of maintaining it to a certain extent, as well as the possibilities of reducing it in the rest. The fourth issue analysed is the multiplicity of canons and the lack of a defined hierarchy of them. I conclude by pointing out that LoI should provide a model by which to assess the correctness of an interpretation. (shrink)

The meaning of an utterance is often enriched by the pragmatic context in which it is uttered. This is because in ordinary conversations we routinely and uncontroversially compress what we say, safe in the knowledge that those interpreting us will ‘add in’ the content we intend to communicate. Does the same thing hold true in the case of legal utterances like ‘This constitution protects the personal rights of the citizen’ or ‘the parliament shall have the power to lay and collect (...) taxes’? This article addresses this question from the perspective of the constitutional originalist—the person who holds that the meaning of a constitutional text is fixed at some historical moment. In doing so, it advances four theses. First, it argues that every originalist theory is committed to some degree of pragmatic enrichment, the debate is about how much. Second, that in determining which content gets ‘added in’, originalists typically hold to a common knowledge standard for enrichment, protestations... (shrink)