Switch to: References

Citations of:

Davidson's thinking causes

In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1993)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Boundless thought. The case of conceptual mental episodes.Pierre Steiner - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (2):269-309.
    I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Akrasia, dispositions and degrees.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):285-308.
    It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Elme és evolúció.Bence Nanay - 2000 - Kávé..
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Replication without replicators.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):455-477.
    According to a once influential view of selection, it consists of repeated cycles of replication and interaction. It has been argued that this view is wrong: replication is not necessary for evolution by natural selection. I analyze the nine most influential arguments for this claim and defend the replication–interaction conception of selection against these objections. In order to do so, however, the replication–interaction conception of selection needs to be modified significantly. My proposal is that replication is not the copying of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Why Davidson is not a property epiphenomenalist.Sophie Gibb - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
    Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Monismo anômalo: uma reconstrução e revisão da literatura.Marcelo Fischborn - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (1):53-66.
    Este artigo reconstrói os argumentos de Donald Davidson (1970) em favor de sua teoria do monismo anômalo e revisa as principais críticas que recebeu. Essa teoria é amplamente rejeitada atualmente e, dadas as inúmeras críticas recebidas, é razoável concluir que qualquer tentativa de reabilitação tem um longo caminho pela frente. A diversidade dessas críticas sugere que não há consenso sobre por que exatamente o monismo anômalo fracassa, embora as dificuldades pareçam convergir sobre a justificação e possibilidade da tese monista, e (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Idealism and the philosophy of mind.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):395-412.
    This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):151-168.
    Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • A Priori Arguments for Reductionism.Jennifer Rea Susse - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Recently, several philosophers have argued that nonreductive physicalism is a false, unstable, and incoherent position. I argue that the position these critics are attacking is a straw one. To help explain why let us distinguish three issues about which nonreductive physicalists might plausibly be thought to have an opinion: ontological considerations about the types of things that exist at a world, issues involving the existence and nature of any dependency relationships between the types of things that exist at a world, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Liberaler Naturalismus und die Wirklichkeit des phänomenalen Erlebens.Godehard Brüntrup - 2004 - In Bernd Goebel, Anna Hauk & Gerhard Kruip (eds.), Probleme des Naturalismus: Philosophische Beiträge. mentis. pp. 183-210.
    Article on liberal naturalism (a version of property dualism) and the reality and causal efficacy of phenomenal experience.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•