Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Opportunity and preference learning.Christian Schubert - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):275-295.
    :Robert Sugden has suggested a normative standard of freedom as ‘opportunity’ that is supposed to help realign normative economics – with its traditional rational choice orientation – with behavioural economics. While allowing preferences to be incoherent, he wants to maintain the anti-paternalist stance of orthodox welfare economics. His standard, though, presupposes that people respond to uncertainty about their own future preferences by dismissing any kind of self-constraint. We argue that the approach lacks psychological substance: Sugden's normative benchmark – the ‘responsible (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • If nudge cannot be applied: a litmus test of the readers’ stance on paternalism. [REVIEW]Chen Li, Zhihua Li & Peter P. Wakker - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (3):297-315.
    A central question in many debates on paternalism is whether a decision analyst can ever go against the stated preference of a client, even if merely intending to improve the decisions for the client. Using four gedanken-experiments, this paper shows that this central question, so cleverly and aptly avoided by libertarian paternalism (nudge), cannot always be avoided. The four thought experiments, while purely hypothetical, serve to raise and specify the critical arguments in a maximally clear and pure manner. The first (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations