Der Beitrag bemüht sich um eine Neubewertung des als Hauptsymptom von Alzheimer-Demenz geltenden Gedächtnisverlustes. Dabei wird auf die in der phänomenologischen Forschung in unterschiedlichen begrifflichen Varianten thematisierte Unterscheidung zwischen explizitem und implizitem Gedächtnis rekurriert und gezeigt, dass im Verlauf von Alzheimer-Demenz das implizite Gedächtnis teilweise länger erhalten bleibt bzw. immer deutlicher hervortritt. Um dies zu belegen, wird in zwei Schritten argumentiert: Im ersten Teil des Papers werden drei Strukturmerkmale der leiblichen Zeit, die dem impliziten Gedächtnis zugrunde liegt, vorgeschlagen: das Absinken (...) aus dem Bewusstsein und die Einverleibung, die höhere Dauerhaftigkeit sowie die Alinearität bzw., positiv formuliert, der transeunte Charakter. Darauf aufbauend wird argumentiert, dass diese präreflexive Leibzeit die Bewusstseinszeit fundiert. Im zweiten Teil des Papers werden die verschiedenen Formen des impliziten Gedächtnisses anhand der erarbeiteten Strukturmerkmale und der sechsteiligen Differenzierung nach Thomas Fuchs beschrieben, um darauf aufbauend eigenständig und mit Bezug auf Selbstzeugnisse von Betroffenen sowie medizinische und pflegerische Quellen deren Relevanz für Alzheimer-Demenz zu untersuchen. Damit soll eine systematische Bezugnahme auf Phänomene leiblicher Erinnerung im Verlauf von Alzheimer-Demenz ermöglicht werden. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 1 Seiten: 48-61.

Theories of personal identity in the tradition of John Locke and Derek Parfit emphasize the importance of psychological continuity and the abilities to think, to remember and to make rational choices as a basic criterion for personhood. As a consequence, persons with severe dementia are threatened to lose the status of persons. Such concepts, however, are situated within a dualistic framework, in which the body is regarded as a mere vehicle of the person, or a carrier of the brain as (...) the organ of mental faculties. Based on the phenomenology of embodiment, this paper elaborates a different approach to personal identity in dementia. In this perspective, selfhood is primarily constituted by pre-reflective self-awareness and the body memory of an individual, which consists in the embodiment and enactment of familiar habits, practices and preferences. After describing the different types of body memory, the paper develops a phenomenology of dementia as a loss of reflexivity and meta-perspective. This is contrasted with the preservation of individual forms of body memory even in the later stages of the illness. The ethical consequences of an embodied approach to dementia are outlined. A final look is given to narrativistic and constructionist concepts of the self in dementia. (shrink)

There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature (...) of embodiment. To illustrate the explanatory potential of this approach, we replicate an agent-based model of embodied social interaction. An analysis of the model demonstrates that the extended body can be explained in terms of mutual dynamical entanglement: inter-bodily resonance between individuals can give rise to self-sustaining interaction patterns that go beyond the behavioral capacities of isolated individuals by modulating their intra-bodily conditions of behavior generation. (shrink)

This paper brings neuroscientific experiments into relation with concepts from phenomenological philosophy to investigate phantom sensations from the perspective of embodied subjectivity. Using a mirror device to create intersensory effects in subjects experiencing phantom sensations, one can create illusions aiming at alleviating phantom pain. Neuroplasticity as a general property of the brain and cortical remapping as a specific mechanism underlying the success of this procedure are interpreted with the phenomenological notions of body image, body schema, and body memory. It is (...) argued that a phantom can be understood as an ambiguous unity of body-imagistic neglect and body-schematic remembering. This neurophenomenological approach highlights the significance of the polarity of subjective-objective embodied experience one the one hand, and the spatial and temporal horizons of the emergence of phantoms on the other. Thereby, implicit and explicit forms of remembering, habitual and reflective modes of behavioural and cognitive self-representation and -understanding can be compared according to how the body integrates its various sensations. (shrink)