- Unphilosophical probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.details
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Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.details
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Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.details
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The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.details
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Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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Falsifizierbarkeit oder Falsifikation?Michael Schmid - 1972 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 3 (1):85-87.details
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Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.details
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Lay arbitration of rules of inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.details
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L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.details
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The irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346-349.details
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Propensity, evidence, and diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345-346.details
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“Is” and “ought” in cognitive science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344-345.details
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Performing competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.details
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Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.details
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Intuition, competence, and performance.Henry E. Kyburg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341-342.details
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Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.details
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Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.details
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Belief, falsification, and Wittgenstein.Dallas M. High - 1972 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (4):240 - 250.details
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Another vote for rationality.Mary Henle - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-339.details
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Human reasoning: Can we judge before we understand?Richard A. Griggs - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):338-339.details
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Can children's irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?Sam Glucksberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):337-338.details
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Can any statements about human behavior be empirically validated?Baruch Fischoff - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):336-337.details
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On defining rationality unreasonably.J. St B. T. Evans & P. Pollard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):335-336.details
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Rationality and the sanctity of competence.Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):334-335.details
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The persistence of cognitive illusions.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):333-334.details
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Status of the rationality assumption in psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.details
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Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.details
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Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.details
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Are people programmed to commit fallacies? Further thoughts about the interpretation of experimental data on probability judgment.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12 (3):251–274.details
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Rational animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.details
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