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  1. Essential properties and the right to life: A response to Lee.Dean Stretton - 2004 - Bioethics 18 (3):264–282.
    ABSTRACT In ‘The Pro‐Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence’, Patrick Lee argues that the right to life is an essential property of those that possess it. On his view, the right arises from one's ‘basic’ or ‘natural’ capacity for higher mental functions: since human organisms have this capacity essentially, they have a right to life essentially. Lee criticises an alternative view, on which the right to life arises from one's ‘developed’ capacity for higher mental functions (or development of some (...)
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  • Is coma morally equivalent to anencephalia?Anthony Serafini - 1993 - Ethics and Behavior 3 (2):187 – 198.
  • Ni vivo ni muerto, sino todo lo contrario. Reflexiones sobre la muerte cerebral.David Rodríguez-Arias - 2013 - Arbor 189 (763):a067.
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  • Re-examining death: against a higher brain criterion.Josie Fisher - 1999 - Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (6):473-476.
    While there is increasing pressure on scarce health care resources, advances in medical science have blurred the boundary between life and death. Individuals can survive for decades without consciousness and individuals whose whole brains are dead can be supported for extended periods. One suggested response is to redefine death, justifying a higher brain criterion for death. This argument fails because it conflates two distinct notions about the demise of human beings--the one, biological and the other, ontological. Death is a biological (...)
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