A wave of interest in Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault as bio-political thinkers was initiated by publication of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer. The intellectual connection of these two figures is, however, broader than their bio-political considerations. Arendt and Foucault both offer detailed accounts of an ethico-political self. Both Arendt’s and Foucault’s later work explores the meaning of living ethically and politically. By examining the relationship between self, ethics and politics, I suggest there are two general points of convergence in Arendt (...) and Foucault regarding the ethico-political self: a shared suspicion of ethical or political systems presented as universally applicable; the attempt to undermine prescriptive moral and political models by fostering a dynamic and critical self-relationship. In the shared attempt to develop a dynamic ethico-political attitude Arendt and Foucault present their respective alternatives to universally applicable moral and political structures, which both consider to be potentially dangerous. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 76-92, Spring 2022.

Individual actions designed to address issues of public concern is a common theme in the discourse on how to mobilize resources and target efforts toward sustainable practices. We contribute to this area by developing and empirically validating a multidimensional scale for civic engagement; synthesizing and testing the adequacy of the theory of planned behavior and the value–belief–norm theory in explaining civic engagement; and considering how an individual’s orientation, identity, and beliefs motivate moral thinking and action. The focus is on the (...) important social issues of global warming and climate change, income inequality, and world poverty, and hunger. We follow both correlational and configurational approaches to examine symmetric and asymmetric causal relationships, respectively. The findings from a sample of 819 US citizens reveal that the TPB and VBN theory can adequately explain civic engagement, after we control for the influence of past experience. In addition, while belief in a just world inhibits the occurrence of adverse consequences and the formation of positive attitudes, social value orientation, and moral identity facilitate them. Notably, at least two causal conditions need to be present for adverse confsequences to emerge, while moral identity is almost a necessary condition for the development of positive attitudes. We conclude with a discussion of important implications for researchers and practitioners. (shrink)

Um tópico de interesse permanente em relação a Sócrates é a determinação dos melhores termos para o entendimento da articulação entre sua vida e sua prática filosófica. O presente artigo busca ensaiar uma discussão introdutória desta questão. Nesse sentido, parte-se de uma restituição, em largos traços, do testemunho das três principais fontes diretas, avança-se daí até algumas formulações atuais centradas no tema do exame para, por último, considerar a matéria à luz da morte de Sócrates e dos desdobramentos que seu (...) exemplo quanto a isso ensejou, já no âmbito das escolas helenísticas. (shrink)

RESUMO Tendo o Livro I da “República” de Platão como seu horizonte de referência, este artigo pretende, enquanto apresenta sumariamente as posições defendidas por Sócrates e Trasímaco sobre a justiça, examinar suas principais implicações para nós, no sentido de estabelecer algumas pistas sobre como responder à pergunta feita em seu título, a saber, “como devemos viver?”. ABSTRACT Having Book I of Plato's "Republic" as its reference horizon, this paper intends, while briefly presenting the positions on justice, as held by Socrates (...) and Thrasymachus, to examine their main implications to us, aiming to establish some clues about how to answer the question made in its title, namely, "how should one live?". (shrink)

Though Machiavelli is famous for advising the mere ‘appearance’ of certain Christian and classical virtues (P XVIII), Machiavellian virtù inherits the legacy (though neither the content nor the telos) of the Christian virtue of humility, a virtue that is not present in pagan Roman accounts of heroism. I am not contending that Machiavelli is a Christian nor that he is continuing a Christian principle. Rather, I am asserting in this article that Machiavelli secularises the distinctly Christian virtue of humility, particularly (...) in its affinity with the virtue of compassion, and that this is particularly true in his Discourses on Livy. To demonstrate how this is so, I compare Machiavelli's treatment of the Roman hero Brutus in the Discourses on Livy to the retelling of the life of Rome's liberator in Augustine's City of God. (shrink)

Korean civil society is often criticized because of its dual nature, that is, the paucity of social capital in everyday life and the plethora of collective political actions in the national civil society. Although liberals view such duality as the critical impediment to Korea’s authentic democratization, which would represent a fundamental, liberal-pluralist transformation of Korean society, this article rather acknowledges its cultural uniqueness and utilizes it as the basis on which to construct a Korean non-liberal democracy that is culturally pertinent (...) and politically viable. First, this article critically re-examines the recent neo-Tocquevillian praise for social capital in light of Tocqueville’s original idea on the art of association, and reveals the liberal-individualistic assumption behind them, with which Confucian-Koreans are culturally unfamiliar. It presents a Korean version of Confucian civil society to promote democratic collective self-government and common citizenship, while rejecting modern Western moral individualism. (shrink)

The position of Socrates in Plato’s earlier dialogues is often seen as an anticipation of contemporary political theories. This article takes issue with the claim that Socrates anticipated modern theories of deliberative democracy. It examines three early Platonic dialogues and argues that the Socrates presented in the dialogues is actually far more dogmatic in ethical as well as religious matters than such annexations of Socrates can acknowledge. Furthermore, Socrates does not develop a theory that would support Athenian democracy. Although politically (...) inactive within the Athenian political framework, Socrates is nonetheless depicted in the Gorgias as formulating an “ethical” view of politics. According to this conception, true politics is always virtue‑ oriented. It is a matter of improving the characters of one’s fellow citizens, and is detached from the question of how political power should be distributed. Socrates’ political outlook is echoed in several Hellenistic philosophical schools, the Stoics in particular. (shrink)

Arendt uses the exemplary validity of Socrates to think and value the possibilities of joint philosophical and political orientations in our present juncture. In this way Arendt’s ‘Socrates’ is not a mythic, historic, or dramatic individual, but offers an example of the best of the human condition. Unfortunately, because Arendt held the social conditioning and constraining of Socrates’ possibilities at arm’s length, his status as an exemplar is problematic and he ends up referring to a historical rather than contemporary possibilities. (...) While Arendt had resources in her notion of the ‘world’ to better ground her simultaneously analytic and normative construction of ‘Socrates’, the lack of a social grounding makes ‘Socrates’ a significantly unmoored and shifting signifier. After showing the vacillations of ‘Socrates’ in Arendt, I supplement her normatively laden account with a Weberian grounding. With this firmer social grounding, ‘Socrates’ can refer to the possibilities of joint philosophical and political orientations in ancient Athens and thereby highlight how our world makes a contemporary version unlikely or impossible. Yet, this Weberian grounding comes at a cost. The normative dimension essential in Arendt’s ‘Socrates’ is lost due to Weberian value-neutrality. ‘Socrates’ can name a contemporary unlikelihood or impossibility, but if the enveloping social order does not value what it renders impossible, Weberian ideal-types on their own are incapable of offering normative resources for critique. I conclude by blending a Weberian social mooring with Arendt’s value-laden framework for social analysis and thereby recuperate the missing normative dimension. In short, by accepting the relational, necessarily plural, and dynamic root of human action we can, much like Arendt’s intended use of ‘Socrates’, value orientations that best express these norms, and criticize contemporary conditions that constrain their realization. (shrink)

(2006). Gray’s Elegy for Progress. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 227-241.

Comienzo examinando algunas pistas, en gran medida falsas, que se han seguido desde los griegos para definir la naturaleza de la ciudadanía científica en una democracia. Sin embargo, el linaje que va desde Platón al positivismo proporciona un contexto útil para entender la evolución de la concepción moderna de conocimiento experto y de los diferentes problemas que éste plantea a las democracias modernas. Estos problemas giran en torno a las cuestiones de la institucionalización —en concreto, a cómo diseñar instituciones que (...) respeten la idea de conocimiento como un principio de orden social sin caer en el gobierno del conocimiento experto—. Después de analizar dos recientes propuestas alemanas que siguen estas líneas, defiendo la institucionalización de las «conferencias de consenso», o jurados de ciudadanos. Finalmente, considero alguna de las implicaciones epistemológicas sociales más generales del papel del «ciudadano científico». (shrink)

This article offers a novel account of a key concept in Hannah Arendt’s political thought: amor mundi. In political theory’s ethical turn, theorists have increasingly turned to amor mundi as a source of ethical guidance and inspiration for politics. However, in doing so, they have elided Arendt’s distinct understanding of care. This article recovers Arendt’s understanding of amor mundi as care for the world by reconstructing the central concerns of her dissertation, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, and tracing them to the (...) “Crisis” essays of Between Past and Future. It shows that amor mundi emerges in the dissertation as part of a question: if love is our fundamental orientation toward the world, how can we love the world without instrumentalizing it? The two “Crisis” essays provide the following answer: if love is to avoid—and perhaps militate against—the instrumentalization of the world, it must take the form of care. Following this analysis, this article contends that the contribution of amor mundi to the ethical turn is best understood, not as the ethos needed to guide action in the political realm, but as a key pre- or nonpolitical ethos needed to conserve the world where politics takes place—and thus the very possibility of politics. (shrink)

Schumpeter took a dim view of the deliberative capacities of the average voter who, he believed, could not be relied upon to make responsible judgements about distant and rather abstract matters of...

This paper argues that Socrates does not claim to be a political expert at Gorgias 521d6-8, as many scholars say. Still, Socrates does claim a special grasp of true politics. His special grasp (i) results from divine dispensation; (ii) is coherent true belief about politics; and (iii) also is Socratic wisdom about his own epistemic shortcomings. This condition falls short of expertise in two ways: Socrates sometimes lacks fully determinate answers to political questions, and he does not grasp the first (...) principles of politics. (shrink)

This thesis examines the Platonic brand in utopian fiction. It looks at Plato's dialogues, H. G Wells' A Modern Utopia and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. The modern texts provide opportunities to observe the effects of ideas found in the dialogues, helping illustrate their implications for the Platonic utopia. Understanding the implications of Plato's textual criticism found in his dialogues is indispensable in understanding how his dialogues are to be understood and what may be understood to be his utopia. This (...) thesis is divided into four chapters; the first two chapters are further divided into sub-headings to assist with navigation of the argument. The first chapter isolates meaning from vocabulary and sets out Socrates' understanding of the relationship between the two entities. The second chapter proceeds to set out Socrates understanding of the hermeneutic effect on the interplay of his dialectic and interlocutors. The third chapter sets out how Socrates seeks to mitigate the distortion of articulated ideas. The fourth chapter concludes the argument stating that Plato's dialogues can only be understood as a unity, that his utopia cannot have a finality, instead it is fluid, free, continuing, Socratic, dialectic. (shrink)

The Council of Europe’s 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: ‘living together as equals in dignity’ points to the need for shared values upon which intercultural dialogue might rest. In order, however, to overcome the monologic separateness that threatens community, we must educate ourselves to recognize the dialogism of our humanity and to engage in deep encounters with others with a mature skepticism of all dogmatisms, including our own. In order to aid us in reaching the necessary insight, the author (...) calls upon Bakhtin’s ideas of the dialogism of every utterance and of the unity and heteroglossia of language, Gadamer’s hermeneutical experience that shakes us loose from what we think we know, and Levinas’s description of that transcendent ideal of a dialogue beyond reciprocity. These perspectives break open our certainty that tribalism and individualism are fundamental, placing them instead as secondary phenomena that, though powerful, pronounce neither the initial nor the final word on our life together. (shrink)

Abstract. — This article argues that the reading of Plato has had an influence on the development of Hannah Arendt’s (1906-1975) political philosophy. It sketches H. Arendt’s profile of the “political Plato” and shows how Plato’s philosophy inspired H. Arendt’s philosophical project. It pays a special attention to the subject of totalitarianism. It shows that H. Arendt’s reading was greatly influenced by the ideological interpretations of Plato of the 1930’s and 1940’s, and by the work and the method of interpretation (...) developed by Martin Heidegger. Résumé. — Cet article pose que la lecture de Platon a influencé le développement de la philosophie politique d’Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). Il esquisse le profil du « Platon politique » arendtien et met en lumière les inspirations que l’oeuvre platonicienne a insufflées au projet philosophique d’H. Arendt, en portant une attention particulière au thème du totalitarisme. Il démontre que la lecture d’H. Arendt a été fortement influencée par les interprétations idéologiques de Platon des années 1930 et 1940, et par les travaux et la méthode d’interprétation développée par Martin Heidegger. (shrink)