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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Normative (or Ethical) Positivism
In Jules L. Coleman (ed.), Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to `the Concept of Law'. Oxford University Press (2001)
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Robert Alexy's claim that law of necessity has a dual nature raises many interesting philosophical questions. In this article, I consider some of these questions, such as what the meaning of the correctness thesis is, whether Alexy's discourse theory supports this thesis, and whether the thesis is defensible; whether Alexy's argument from anarchy and civil war supports the claim that law of necessity has a real dimension; and what the implications are of the use of moral arguments, such as the (...) |
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When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking about legal (...) |
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One of the central debates in legal philosophy is the debate over legal positivism. Roughly, positivists say that law is ultimately grounded in social facts alone, whereas antipositivists say it is ultimately grounded in both social facts and moral facts. In this paper, I argue that philosophers involved in the dispute over legal positivism sometimes employ distinct concepts when they use the term “law” and pick out different things in the world using these concepts. Because of this, what positivists say (...) |
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Law contains many dualities, though most, if not all, of these dualities resolve into one complex puzzle: To what extent is law a matter of pure social facts, or moral value untethered to social facts? I argue that each concept of law reconciles this duality in a different way on the basis of certain beneficial consequences that might result. Instead of pitting concepts against one another universally, we should accept that the balance between law's social fact and moral value dimensions (...) |
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Legal positivism's ``separation thesis'' is usually taken in one of two ways: as an analytic claim about the nature of law – roughly, as some version of the Social Thesis; or as a substantive claim about the moral value of law – roughly, as some version of the Value Thesis. In this paper I argue that we should recognize a third kind of positivist separation thesis, one which complements, but is distinct from, positivism's analytic and moral claims. The Neutrality Thesis (...) |
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This paper explores the contribution by the contemporary legal realist Hanoch Dagan. Dagan’s brand of realism defines law on the basis of its institutions or social practices, not of its norms or rules. The paper first provides a critical overview of this realist theory of law: It is not synonymous with the predictive theory of law, with Leiter’s theory of judges, or Frank’s “breakfast theory”. By focusing on the role of judges and the methodology of legal reasoning, we discover that (...) |
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In this paper, I argue against international normative positivism, i.e., against the idea that the separation of international legal judgement from moral reasoning is not only possible, but also a... No categories |
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El presente trabajo trata de hacer una defensa de una particular versión de positivismo jurídico excluyente como teoría que mejor describe el derecho y sus referencias a la moral. Aunque se reivindica la tesis de las fuentes como la tesis iuspositivista por excelencia, el quid de la defensa se asienta sobre un análisis de los diferentes tipos y conceptos de moral que se consideran relevantes a la hora de la identificación del derecho. La posibilidad del error en el descubrimiento de (...) No categories |
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As their title suggests, "legal philosophers" are more philosophers than lawyers; they are in the business of thinking generally about law rather than doing law in any practical way. While lawyers tend to be jurisdiction-specific in their affiliations and competence, legal philosophers are under no such restriction. At their most ambitious, legal philosophers claim dominion over a jurisprudential realm that is delineated by neither geography nor history. Indeed, presenting themselves as intellectual citizens of the whole legal world, their crafted contributions (...) |
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Through a critical engagement with Jeremy Waldron’s work, as well as the work of other writers, I offer an account of the relative scope of the morality of war, the laws of war, and war crimes. I propose an instrumentalist account of the laws of war, according to which the laws of war should help soldiers conform to the morality of war. The instrumentalist account supports Waldron’s conclusion that the laws of war justifiably prohibit attacks on civilians even if it (...) |
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Modern international law has an inseparable, yet uneasy connection to the analytical tradition in jurisprudence, yet the two have not been easy bedfellows. International lawyers have struggled to find a convincing account of the legality of the object of their study, largely retreating into pragmatism, whilst legal theorists have marginalised the study of international law as a result. In this article, however, I will consider recent hopes for a re-engagement between the two disciplines, brought about by a growing dissatisfaction with (...) |
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¿Puede la tesis del reemplazo de Raz sobrevivir en el contexto de una teoría dworkiniana del derecho y de la adjudicación? Judging Positivism, de Margaret Martin, fornece una de las mejores reconstrucciones y una de las más interesantes críticas ya planteadas contra la influyente filosofía del derecho de Joseph Raz. En uno de los pasos centrales de su argumento, Martin desafía una sumisión central de Raz, que es el intento de combinar la tesis del reemplazo con la tesis de la (...) No categories |
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