Commentators on the ethics of translational research find it morally problematic. Types of translational research are said to involve questionable benefits, special risks, additional barriers to informed consent, and severe conflicts of interest. Translational research conducted on the global poor is thought to exploit them and increase international disparities. Some commentators support especially stringent ethical review. However, such concerns are grounded only in pre-approval translational research (now called T1 ). Whether or not T1 has these features, translational research beyond approval (...) ( T2 : phase IV, health services, and implementation research) is unlikely to and, when conducted on the global poor, may support development. Therefore, insofar as T1 is morally problematic, and no independent objections to T2 exist, the ethics of translational research is diverse: while some translational research is problematic, some is not. Funding and oversight should reflect this diversity, and T2 should be encouraged, particularly when conducted among the global poor. (shrink)

(2010). Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “How to Do Research Fairly in an Unjust World”. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. W4-W6.

The foundations of research ethics are riven with fault lines emanating from a fear that if research is too closely connected to weighty social purposes an imperative to advance the common good through research will justify abrogating the rights and welfare of study participants. The result is an impoverished conception of the nature of research, an incomplete focus on actors who bear important moral responsibilities, and a system of ethics and oversight highly attuned to the dangers of research but largely (...) silent about threats of ineffective, inefficient, and inequitable medical practices and health systems. -/- In For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics, Alex John London defends a conception of the common good that grounds a moral imperative with two requirements. The first is to promote research that generates the information necessary to enable key social institutions to effectively, efficiently, and equitably safeguard the basic interests of individuals. The second is to ensure that research is organized as a voluntary scheme of social cooperation that respects its various contributors' moral claims to be treated as free and equal. Connecting research to the goals of a just social order grounds a framework for assessing and managing research risk that reconciles these requirements and justifies key oversight practices in non-paternalistic terms. Reconceiving research ethics as resolving coordination problems and providing credible assurance that these requirements are being met expands the issues and actors that fall within the purview of the field and provides the foundation for a more unified and coherent approach to domestic and international research. -/- This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. (shrink)

How are we to appraise new technological developments that may bring revolutionary social changes? Currently this is often done by trying to predict or anticipate social consequences and to use these as a basis for moral and regulatory appraisal. Such an approach can, however, not deal with the uncertainties and unknowns that are inherent in social changes induced by technological development. An alternative approach is proposed that conceives of the introduction of new technologies into society as a social experiment. An (...) ethical framework for the acceptability of such experiments is developed based on the bioethical principles for experiments with human subjects: non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. This provides a handle for the moral and regulatory assessment of new technologies and their impact on society. (shrink)

Seit vielen Jahren zeigen Untersuchungen, dass die Ergebnisse klinischer Studien häufig selektiv publiziert werden mit einer statistisch signifikanten und im klinischen Ausmaß sehr bedeutenden Übervorteilung positiver Studienergebnisse. Diese selektive Publikation führt zu einer systematischen Fehlleitung verschiedener medizinischer Entscheidungen bzw. der diesen Entscheidungen zu Grunde liegenden Nutzen-Schaden-Abwägungen. Man muss davon ausgehen, dass solche Fehlleitungen die Patientenversorgung, die Patientenaufklärung, den Probandenschutz und die medizinische Lehre verschlechtern und somit in vielerlei Hinsicht ethisch unakzeptable Konsequenzen haben. Studienregister stellen die international bevorzugte Strategie dar, um (...) der selektiven Publikation entgegenzutreten. Wann und in welchem Umfang für in Deutschland durchgeführte klinische Studien eine Verpflichtung zur Studienregistrierung faktisch etabliert wird ist weiterhin offen. Der vorliegende Artikel führt unter Verweis auf zentrale internationale Literatur in die theoretischen und empirischen Hintergründe zum selektiven Publizieren und zur Studienregistrierung ein. Die ethischen Probleme des selektiven Publizierens werden systematisch dargestellt. Hierauf aufbauend wird für die Notwendigkeit einer restriktiven Regulierung der Studienregistrierung seitens der deutschen Gesundheitspolitik und der medizinischen Selbstverwaltung zur deutlichen Reduktion des selektiven Publizierens argumentiert. Abschließend diskutiert der Beitrag, inwieweit den deutschen Institutionen der medizinischen und forschenden Selbstverwaltung eine prospektive und retrospektive Verantwortung für eine effektive Regulierung der Studienregistrierung (bzw. für das Fehlen eben dieser) zugeschrieben werden kann. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungSeit vielen Jahren zeigen Untersuchungen, dass die Ergebnisse klinischer Studien häufig selektiv publiziert werden mit einer statistisch signifikanten und im klinischen Ausmaß sehr bedeutenden Übervorteilung positiver Studienergebnisse. Diese selektive Publikation führt zu einer systematischen Fehlleitung verschiedener medizinischer Entscheidungen bzw. der diesen Entscheidungen zu Grunde liegenden Nutzen-Schaden-Abwägungen. Man muss davon ausgehen, dass solche Fehlleitungen die Patientenversorgung, die Patientenaufklärung, den Probandenschutz und die medizinische Lehre verschlechtern und somit in vielerlei Hinsicht ethisch unakzeptable Konsequenzen haben. Studienregister stellen die international bevorzugte Strategie dar, um (...) der selektiven Publikation entgegenzutreten. Wann und in welchem Umfang für in Deutschland durchgeführte klinische Studien eine Verpflichtung zur Studienregistrierung faktisch etabliert wird ist weiterhin offen. Der vorliegende Artikel führt unter Verweis auf zentrale internationale Literatur in die theoretischen und empirischen Hintergründe zum selektiven Publizieren und zur Studienregistrierung ein. Die ethischen Probleme des selektiven Publizierens werden systematisch dargestellt. Hierauf aufbauend wird für die Notwendigkeit einer restriktiven Regulierung der Studienregistrierung seitens der deutschen Gesundheitspolitik und der medizinischen Selbstverwaltung zur deutlichen Reduktion des selektiven Publizierens argumentiert. Abschließend diskutiert der Beitrag, inwieweit den deutschen Institutionen der medizinischen und forschenden Selbstverwaltung eine prospektive und retrospektive Verantwortung für eine effektive Regulierung der Studienregistrierung (bzw. für das Fehlen eben dieser) zugeschrieben werden kann. (shrink)

Supervised injectable opioid assisted treament prescribes injectable opioids to individuals for whom other forms of addiction treatment have been ineffective. In this article, we examine arguments that opioid-dependent people should be assumed incompetent to voluntarily consent to clinical research on siOAT unless proven otherwise. We agree that concerns about competence and voluntary consent deserve careful attention in this context. But we oppose framing the issue solely as a matter of the competence of opioid-dependent people and emphasize that it should be (...) considered in the context of inequities in access to siOAT as a medical treatment. Consequently, we suggest that bioethics literature on nonexploitation, which focuses on clinical research in low-income countries, is helpful due to locating ethical issues within systemic social conditions. Finally, we consider the implications of our argument for the ethics of clinical research on siOAT. (shrink)

In contrast to most publications on the ethics of paying research subjects, which start by identifying and analyzing major ethical concerns raised by the practice (in particular, risks of undue inducement and exploitation) and end with a set of—more or less well-justified—ethical recommendations for using payment schemes immune to these problems, this paper offers a systematic, principle-based ethical analysis of the practice. It argues that researchers have aprima faciemoral obligation to offer payment to research subjects, which stems from the principle (...) of social beneficence. This principle constitutes an ethical “spine” of the practice. Other ethical principles of research ethics (respect for autonomy, individual beneficence, and justice/fairness) make up an ethical “skeleton” of morally sound payment schemes by providing additional moral reasons for offering participants (1) recompense for reasonable expenses; and (2a) remuneration conceptualized as a reward for their valuable contribution, provided (i) it meets standards of equality, adequacy and non-exploitation, and (ii) it is not overly attractive (i.e., it does not constitute undue inducement for participation or retention, and does not encourage deceptive behaviors); or (2b) remuneration conceptualized as a market-driven price, provided (i) it is necessary and designed to help the study achieve its social and scientific goals, (ii) it does not reinforce wider social injustices and inequalities; (iii) it meets the requirement of non-exploitation; and (iv) it is not overly attractive. The principle of justice provides a strong ethical reason for not offering recompenses for lost wages (or loss of other reasonably expected profits). (shrink)

When a new intervention or drug is developed, this has to pass through various phases of clinical testing before it achieves market approval, which can take many years. This raises an issue for drugs which could benefit terminally ill patients. These patients might set their hopes on the experimental drug but are unable to wait since they are likely to pass away before the drug is available. As a means of nevertheless getting access to experimental drug, many seriously ill and (...) terminally ill patients are therefore very willing to participate in randomised controlled trials. However, only very few terminally ill patients are able to actually participate, and those that do participate are at risk of participating solely as a way of getting experimental drugs. Currently, there are, however, ways of getting access to drugs that have not gained market approval. One such mean is via expanded access or compassionate use programs where terminally ill patients receive experimental new drugs that are not yet market approved. In this paper, I examine some of the common justifications for such programs. The most frequently voiced justifications for compassionate use or expanded access programs could be put in one of three categories. First, there are justifications of justice, where compassionate use programs could be seen as a just or fair way to distribute experimental new drugs to patients who are denied access to RCT’s through no fault of their own. Second, such programs could be justified by reference to the ethical principle of beneficence where it could be claimed that terminally ill patients stand to benefit greatly at very little risk. Third, there are considerations of autonomy where, it is claimed, patients should be able to exercise their autonomy and have access to such drugs if that is there free choice and they are fully aware of the risks associated with that choice. In this paper, I argue currently all justifications are potentially problematic. If they truly form the basis for justification, compassionate use programs should be designed to maximize justice, beneficence and autonomy. (shrink)

The “fair benefits” approach to international research is designed to produce results that all can agree are fair without taking a stand on divisive questions of justice. But its appealing veneer of collaboration masks ambiguities at both a conceptual and an operational level. An attempt to put it into practice would look a lot like an auction, leaving little reason to think the outcomes will satisfy even minimal conditions of fairness.

Individuals with limited resources are often presumed to be vulnerable in research. Concerns include the possibility of impaired decision making, susceptibility to undue inducement, and risk of exploitation. Although each of these concerns should be considered by investigators and IRBs, none justifies categorical exclusion of individuals with limited resources.

Vulnerability in research is often understood as a diminished ability to protect one's own interests, manifested by a compromised capacity to give informed or voluntary consent. Certain groups of people are thought to be more vulnerable than others and therefore are at risk of being exploited or mistreated in research. Accordingly, the federal regulations call for additional safeguards to protect vulnerable groups.There remains some ambiguity and contradiction, however, regarding what groups are vulnerable in research and why,3 since the available codes (...) of research ethics and regulations describe many groups as vulnerable. When so many groups are considered vulnerable, but no specification is offered as to how they are vulnerable or what particular protections are appropriate, the possibility of meaningful safeguards is diminished. In addition, current concepts of vulnerability are usually applied to whole groups of people, without distinguishing between individuals in a group who might truly have a compromised capacity to protect their own interests from those who do not. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page W1-W3, June 2011.

In this paper we distinguish two competing conceptions of dignity, one recognizably Hobbesian and one recognizably Kantian. We provide a formal model of how decision-makers committed to these conceptions of dignity might reason when engaged in an economic transaction that is not inherently insulting, but in which it is possible for the dignity of the agent to be called into question. This is a modified version of the ultimatum game. We then use this model to illustrate ways in which the (...) Kantian evaluative standpoint enjoys a kind of internal stability that the Hobbesian framework lacks. Our interpersonal argument shows that, under certain conditions, Hobbesians prefer to cultivate Kantian commitments in others and promote the presence of Kantians in the population. Our intrapersonal argument shows that agents who are conflicted between Kantian and Hobbesian commitments have powerful reasons not to resolve this commitment in favour of Hobbesian values. Our emulation argument illustrates that in repeated versions of the ultimatum game, the Hobbesian chooses to behave like a Kantian, including publicly repudiating her Hobbesian commitments. Here again, however, the Hobbesian is able to achieve a desired benefit only on the condition that there are genuine Kantians in the population. Finally, our social planning argument explores the reasons why a community of Hobbesians would opt to enshrine a Kantian conception of dignity into law. The paper concludes with some remarks about the policy implications of this work. The value or worth of a man is, as for all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another... The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. Hobbes, _Leviathan X_, 16. (shrink)

The main question explored by the book is: How can cross-border access to human genetic resources, such as blood or DNA samples, be governed in such a way as to achieve equity for vulnerable populations in developing countries? The book situates the field of genomic and genetic research within global health and research frameworks, describing the concerns that have been raised about the potential unfairness in exchanges during recent decades. Access to and sharing in the benefits of human biological resources (...) are aspects not regulated by any international legal framework such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, which applies only to the exchange of plants, animals and microorganisms, as well as to associated traditional knowledge. Examples of genetic research perceived as exploitative are provided in order to illustrate the legal vacuum concerning the global governance of human genetic resources. The main conclusions drawn from the legal and ethical analysis are: - Benefit sharing is crucial in order to avoid the exploitation of developing countries in human genetic research. - With functioning research ethics committees, undue inducement is less of a concern in genetic research than in other areas of medical research (e.g. clinical trials). - Concerns remain over research involving indigenous populations; accordingly, recommendations are provided. In drawing these conclusions, the book addresses in detail a highly pressing topic in global bioethics and international law. In this regard, it combines bioethical arguments with jurisprudence, in particular with reference to the law of equity and the legal concepts of duress (coercion), unconscionable dealing, and undue inducement. (shrink)

El problema de la transición de los participantes desde una investigación hacia la atención de la salud apropiada es un problema global. La publicación de una nueva versión de la Declaración de Helsinki es una excelente oportunidad para repensar este problema. Según mi interpretación, la Declaración de Helsinki 2013 introduce dos tipos diferentes de obligaciones posinvestigación, a saber, (1) obligaciones de acceso a atención de la salud y (2) obligaciones de acceso a información. Los beneficiarios pretendidos de estas obligaciones son (...) los participantes individuales de estudios de investigación. Y la Declaración identifica a los patrocinadores, investigadores y gobiernos de los países anfitriones como los principales agentes responsables de cumplir con las obligaciones posinvestigación. Para justificar esta interpretación de los tipos, agentes y beneficiarios de las obligaciones posinvestigación, presento primero una clasificación tentativa de las obligaciones posinvestigación. Luego hago una breve reconstrucción conceptual de las formulaciones de las obligaciones posinvestigación en las versiones anteriores de la Declaración y reviso las principales críticas. Finalmente presento un análisis crítico de la nueva formulación de las obligaciones posinvestigación basándome en la discusión de las secciones anteriores. [ABSTRACT] The problem of transitioning research participants when the study is concluded to the appropriate health care is a global problem. The publication of a new version of the Declaration of Helsinki and its public discussion is a great opportunity to rethink this problem. According to my interpretation, the Declaration of Helsinki 2013 identifies two different types of post-trial obligations, namely, (1) obligations of access to health care and (2) the obligations of access to information. The intended beneficiaries of these obligations are individual participants of research studies. And the Declaration identifies the sponsors, researchers and host country governments as the main agents responsible for complying with the post-trial obligations mentioned above. To justify this interpretation of the types, agents and beneficiaries of post-trial obligations, I first introduce a tentative classification of post-trial obligations. Then I make a brief conceptual reconstruction of formulations of post-trial obligations in earlier versions of the Declaration and revise the main critiques. Finally I advance a critical analysis of the new formulation of post-trial obligations based on the discussion in the previous sections. (shrink)