- The metaphysical importance of the compatibility question: comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.details
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Taking the Self out of Self-Rule.Michael Garnett - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):21-33.details
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What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.details
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God, free will, and time: the free will offense part II. [REVIEW]J. L. Schellenberg - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):1-10.details
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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Control, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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The BCN challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.details
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Power and moral responsibility.Thomas Pink - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):127 – 149.details
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Responsibility, rational abilities, and two kinds of fairness arguments.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):151 – 165.details
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Introduction: Responsibility for action and belief.Carlos J. Moya & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81 – 86.details
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Moral Agency.Timothy Nailer - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Adelaidedetails
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The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):291-307.details
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Asymmetries in judgments of responsibility and intentional action.Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):24-50.details
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Responsibility as a Virtue.Garrath Williams - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):455-470.details
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Evidence-Responsiveness and Autonomy.Steven Weimer - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):621-642.details
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Identifications, Volitions and the Case of Successful Psychopaths.Somogy Varga - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):87-106.details
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The rationality of collective guilt.Deborah Tollefsen - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):222–239.details
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What's Wrong With Undermatching?Michael Tiboris - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 48 (4):646-664.details
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Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.details
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The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action.Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.details
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Self-expression: a deep self theory of moral responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.details
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Free will and the construction of options.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2913-2933.details
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Dupes of Patriarchy: Feminist Strong Substantive Autonomy's Epistemological Weaknesses.Elizabeth Sperry - 2013 - Hypatia 28 (4):887-904.details
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Moral responsibility: The difference of Strawson, and the difference it should make.Andrew Sneddon - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.details
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Volitional excuses, self-narration, and blame.Marion Smiley - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):85-101.details
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The importance of what they care about.Matthew Noah Smith - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):297-314.details
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Responsibility as Answerability.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):99-126.details
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Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance.Holly M. Smith - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.details
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
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Consumer autonomy and sufficiency of gmf labeling.Helena Siipi & Susanne Uusitalo - 2008 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 21 (4):353-369.details
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Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.details
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Responsibility and disability.David Shoemaker - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):438-461.details
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Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Causation and responsibility.Carolina Sartorio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):749–765.details
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Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.details
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A new argument for skepticism.Baron Reed - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.details
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Autonomy and the Normativity Question: Framing Considerations.Mark Piper - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):204 - 224.details
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Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.details
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Responsibility and rational abilities: Defending an asymmetrical view.Dana K. Nelkin - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):497-515.details
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Freedom, responsibility and the challenge of situationism.Dana K. Nelkin - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.details
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Do we have a coherent set of intuitions about moral responsibility?Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.details
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Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
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