Abstract
This paper examines the role of managerial self-interest in the merger market. It looks at factors influencing managers' merger decisions by analyzing managerial expense preference factors on cross-sectional data employing non-parametric statistical methods. The same factors are examined for acquiring, acquired, and merging firms, and control groups used in each case. The results support the authors' contention that managerial discretion is a significant motivating factor for mergers. The changes in expense preference factors indicate management decisions which provide conditions allowing management to indulge in management preferred expenditures, while reducing risk to their career. The authors then provide a moral/philosophic framework of ethical analysis for examining manager's merger decisions, using teleological and deontological theories. They conclude that merger decisions motivated or influenced by self-interest are unethical and, in the process, provide managers facing a merger decision with a framework for making an ethical decision.
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Dr. Francis Achampong is a Professor of Business Law and Insurance at Norfolk State University, in Norfolk, Virginia. He is licensed to practice law in New York and Virginia. He has published in journals such as theJournal of Risk and Insurance, theInternational and Comparative Law Quarterly, Dickinson Law Review, and theAkron Law Review.
Dr. Wold Zemedkun is an Associate Professor of Finance at Norfolk State University, In Norfolk, Virginia. He has published in journals such as theJournal of Business Strategies, theAkron Business and Economic Review,, theJournal of Financial Education, and theAtlantic Economic Journal.
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Achampong, F.K., Zemedkun, W. An empirical and ethical analysis of factors motivating managers' merger decisions. J Bus Ethics 14, 855–865 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00872351
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00872351