Abstract
There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question.
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Notes
This is clearly a false dilemma, as we may instead negotiate, vote, flip a coin, or let somebody else decide. However, once we commit to any of these other non-violent strategies of resolution, we do so with the agreement that the results of the method are binding. If we don’t operate on that agreement, then the only option seems avoidance or violence.
See Kelly’s “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement” (2005) for a similar assessment of higher-order evidence.
The expression ‘go to the mat’ is a sporting metaphor for argumentative exchange. It evokes wrestlers engaged in a match with each willing to risk being pinned and beaten to win. On the analogy with games, I will use sporting metaphors and vocabulary to help elucidate other elements of argumentative contexts. This risks two kinds of misrepresentations: one that argumentation is merely a game, and the other that argumentation must be adversarial with winners and losers. The former worry may be mitigated by the fact that game-analogies are not generally used to downplay the importance of the analysandum, as can be seen in Wittgenstein’s use of ‘language games.’ The latter worry is one that the game analogy and a good deal of the vocabulary derived from it inculcate a combative or militaristic view of argumentative exchange. I, however, am not entirely averse to seeing arguments under such an aegis. Arguments are often the appropriate rule-bound alternative to bald aggression, but in being an alternative to bald aggression, the rules and their articulation do not have to require the aggression be sublimated or foregone.
A further concern about identity in cognitive contexts, especially with one’s identity hinging on a view, is that when others attack the view or even question it, one is more likely to take these challenges to the person. See Aikin and Anderson (2006, p. 19) for a Socratic argumentative norm underlying this concern. This problem of identity epistemology is clearly on display when those criticized describe the critics as those who “bash” the view, or those who are “haters”. A further concern would be that all criticism would be ad hominem abusive.
This, perhaps, is an overstatement. In many fields, the tools of inquiry are those of collecting data, tabulating results, and organizing information. However, all of these tools are mobilized for the sake of making a case.
Talisse and Aikin (2007, p. 662) have made a version of this argument regarding moral consequences of scientific research. It is an extension of Williams’ (1963, 100f) argument that consequentialism cannot countenance long term moral projects. Psychological and anthropological research bears this out in the correlation between people having interests in some subject and their cognitive “category exhaustion” as a case for the division of labor (Keil 2005, pp. 145–147).
See Hoffer’s The True Believer (1963).
Two famous examples of such ‘schooling’ in the history of philosophy are Socrates’ exchange with Parmenides in Plato’s Parmenides, and Wittgenstein’s conversations with Gottlob Frege, after which, Wittgenstein told his friends that Frege “wiped the floor” with him (Monk 1990, p. 36).
See Cohen’s “Deeper into Bullshit” for an account of the vices of unclear writing (2006).
Thanks to Mason Marshall for help formulating the outline of this exchange.
Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for this point.
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Aikin, S.F. Holding One’s Own. Argumentation 22, 571–584 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9066-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9066-7