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Notes
If not stated otherwise, the references between parentheses in the text correspond to Haugeland 2013.
I do not mean by this to summarize all the aspects that make Haugeland’s reading of Heidegger both inspiring and controversial, not even to capture the most idiosyncratic of Haugeland’s reading of Heidegger. I will for instance barely mention his famous, peculiar and highly controversial analysis of the Heideggerian treatment of death in terms of a Kuhnean scientific terminal crisis; see about it Rouse, “Love and Death”, in press; in critical terms see Blattner 1994). But I expect this to give the potential reader a taste of why reading this volume would be of interest both for those interested in Heidegger and for those involved in the contemporary debates on intentionality (and perhaps would lead the former to draw their attention to such debates and arise the interest of the latter to take a fresh look at Heidegger).
Those familiar with Haugeland’s account of objects, for instance, in perception, will recognize here his own idea according to which perceiving an object as such entails perceiving the properties it can have and those it cannot according to the principles of cohesiveness and integrity. See Haugeland 1998, ch. 10, in particular pp. 260 ff. This is what explains that if we see a ball in the middle of the room that appears and disappears randomly, we will be led to deny its status as a material object, just because that is not a possibility of material objects as such.
As Haugeland rightly emphasizes, Heidegger probably chooses ‘possibility’ instead of other more practical related terms because “it pertains to all intelligible entities as such” (151).
The problem concerning what Dasein is can be both understood extensionally and intensionally. The former concerns whether Dasein refers to singular persons, entire societies, corpus of beliefs or what have you. While the standard position claims it is singular persons, Haugeland controversially argued it is the latter (see for example his very first paper on Heidegger, 1982’s “Heidegger on Being a Person”, but also his 2007 “Death and Dasein”, both in this volume). His understanding of ‘death’ as a Kuhnian paradigm crisis depends of this interpretation. Intensionally, the discussion concerns whether ‘Dasein’ is a singular term, a sortal, a predicate, etc. Does it name a kind of being or an entity? See Haugeland’s discussion with Brandom in “Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger” in this volume, esp. pp. 157–160, but also the chapter on the Being Question in the book project (this volume, pp. 57ff). A good picture of the debate is to be found in McDaniel 2009.
References
Blattner, W. (1994). The concept of death in being and time. Man and World, 27, 49–70.
Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial intelligence. The very idea. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Haugeland, J. (1998). Having thought. Essays in the metaphysics of mind. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Haugeland, J. (2013). In J. Rouse (Ed.), Dasein disclosed. John Haugeland’s Heidegger. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Heidegger, M. (1927). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
McDaniel, K. (2009). Ways of Being. In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manning & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics (pp. 290–319). Oxford: Oxford UP.
Rouse, J. (in press), “Love and Death”. In Z. Adams (Ed.). Truth and Understanding. Essays in Honor of John Haugeland.
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Ainbinder, B. John Haugeland: Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland’s Heidegger. Edited by Joseph Rouse. Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 1171–1177 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9361-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9361-3