Hume Studies

Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 2, November 1995, pp. 289-313 The Problem of the National Self in Hume's Theory of Justice DONALD C. AINSLIE Although David Hume's theory of justice has two components—an account of the emergence of the artifices of justice and an account of why we find moral worth in those who stay within the limits imposed by those artifices—contemporary interpreters of Hume have tended to focus primarily on the former component.1 One reason for their restricted focus is the dominance of contractarianism in contemporary liberal thought. And, despite Hume's rejection of the idea of an original contract (the central Whig orthodoxy of his time), he nonetheless describes the evolution of the artifices of justice as depending on their serving the interests of each person who participates in them. Thus, this component of his view has a structure similar to that of the hypothetical contract (the central liberal orthodoxy of our own time), best exemplified in the writings of John Rawls.2 In this sort of contractarianism, social institutions are just only if they would be freely chosen by an impartial rational agent; this condition aims to ensure that the institutions serve the interests of each person who is to be governed by them. In this paper I try to challenge contractarian readings of Hume by emphasizing the significance of the second component of his theory, at least as it appears in the Treatise. In particular, I focus on issues of nationality, issues which usually fall outside of the scope of contemporary contractarianism. In Rawls' theory, for example, how are we to understand who makes up the society the justice of which is being reflected upon? And how are we to apply Donald C. Ainslie is at the Department of Philosophy, 1001 CL, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. e-mail: dcast2+@pitt.edu 290 Donald C. Ainslie such reflections to the particular states we happen to inhabit?3 Ongoing nationalist struggles show that these questions are not trivial. Defining the citizenry of an otherwise just state can be the cause of more real discord than the injustices of a state in which there is agreement as to who counts as a citizen . Hume, I will argue, has a place within his theory of justice for consideration of these issues, for he integrates nationality into the moral component of the theory: the sympathy-based approbation of the artifices of justice is only possible if members of a society have an affinity for one another—if they form a nation. And I show below how Hume's theory of the passions contains the ingredients for an explanation of these national affinities. In the first three parts of the paper, I draw on Hume's discussions of justice and the passions in the Treatise and on his essay, "Of National Characters." There is evidence both in Hume's philosophical writings and his personal letters that throughout his life he, like many of the other eighteenth century Scottish literati, felt ongoing anxiety over issues of nationality.4 He was, after all, born only four years after his native Scotland entered into a political union with England. Thus Hume worried about the use of Scottish idioms in his writing ("the Vices of Expression, incident to this Country" [HL I 369]5); he identified Hutcheson, who was born in Belfast, as one of his "English" countrymen , whose philosophy he hoped to emulate (T xvii); he chose England, not Britain or Scotland, as the topic for his massive History; and he was a consistent booster in England of Scottish men of letters—if, that is, they wrote in proper English. In the final sections of the paper, I consider why, despite his personal unease over Scotland's place in a united Britain under English hegemony, Hume remained a steadfast supporter of the Union. Why did Hume not take the route that was to be adopted later in the century by nationalists, who argued that the boundaries of a state ought to correspond with the boundaries of a nation? I also consider why Hume's philosophical thoughts on nationality are left only implicit, why he did not...