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Historical differentiation, moral judgment and the modern criminal law

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Notes

  1. ‘Space, Time and Function: intersecting principles of responsibility across the terrain of criminal justice’, this issue DOI 10.1007/s11572-006-9025-7.

  2. DPP v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 161.

  3. Op. cit., this issue.

  4. Op. cit., this issue.

  5. The Victorian Criminal Law Commissioners were absolutely explicit about this: see the introductory comments to their 1843 Report, quoted in Norrie (2001a, p. 15).

  6. Op. cit., this issue.

  7. What I have described elsewhere as a Kantian ‘morality of form’: See Norrie (2000).

  8. Ramsay (2006).

  9. Op. cit., 2007.

  10. This was, I have argued, the underlying message of Lord Hoffmann’s much maligned judgment in Morgan Smith [2000] 4 All ER 289 where the instruction to the jury to apply community standards to distinguish provocation cases is balanced against the otherwise thorough-going subjectivism of the judgement. See Norrie (2001b).

  11. See e.g. R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38; see also Arlidge (2001).

  12. Re A (children) [2000] 4 All ER 961.

  13. See e.g. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.

References

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  1. School of Law, King’s College London, London, UK

    Alan Norrie

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  1. Alan Norrie
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Correspondence to Alan Norrie.

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Thanks to Peter Ramsay for his comments.

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Norrie, A. Historical differentiation, moral judgment and the modern criminal law. Criminal Law, Philosophy 1, 251–257 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-006-9021-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-006-9021-y

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