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Inferences about Seeing1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Peter Alexander
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Extract

In his book Attention, Professor Alan White says ‘When you see X, it follows that if X is Y, you see Y whether you realise it or not.’ If, in passing through Paris, I saw a tall complex iron structure and that structure is the Eiffel Tower, then I saw the Eiffel Tower whether I realised it or not. I accept this, but because recent philosophical writings and discussions have cast doubt on the validity of the inference-pattern

I saw x; x is y; so I saw y

and certain related patterns, it is clear that we cannot be content with this unvarnished statement. Various entertaining examples are produced to show that some instances of this pattern are invalid and therefore that the pattern itself is invalid. If I saw Jones at noon and at noon Jones was bribing Smith then, it is alleged, I cannot conclude that I saw Jones bribing Smith. Similarly, it is said, from the facts that I saw a man in the far distance and that that man was my father, I cannot conclude that I saw my father in the far distance; from the facts that I saw a foot and that that foot was Lloyd George's I cannot conclude that I saw Lloyd George.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 3: Knowledge and Necessity , March 1969 , pp. 73 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1969

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Footnotes

1

This is a revised and expanded version of a paper read at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, at Minneapolis in May 1966. I am indebted to Professor Frederick L. Will, who was the Commentator on that occasion, for helping me to see how my argument needed modification.

References

page 73 note 2 White, Alan R., Attention (Oxford, 1964) p. 54.Google ScholarPubMed

page 73 note 3 Some examples, but not necessarily the view I am criticising, are to be found in: Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, in Analytical Philosophy, ed. Butler, R. J., Second Series (Oxford, 1965)Google Scholar; Chisholm, R. M., Perceiving (Ithaca, N.Y., 1947)Google Scholar; Ebersole, F., ‘How Philosophers See Stars’, Mind (1965)Google Scholar; Austin, J. L., Sense and Sensibila (Oxford, 1962) pp. 98 ff.Google Scholar Other examples have been suggested by P. Geach and, in conversation, by Paul Ziff.

page 76 note 1 I am grateful to Professor Will for drawing my attention to this point. The word ‘modifier’ has to be interpreted with care. Thus ‘I saw a fruit; that fruit was a halftomato; so I saw a tomato’ is invalid. The test for a modifier, where m is a modifier of y, is that in place of ‘an m y’ we can say ‘a y which is m’.

page 79 note 1 See Vesey, G. N. A., ‘Seeing and Seeing As’, in Proc. Arist. Soc., LVI (1955–1956).Google Scholar

page 80 note 1 Soltis, J. F. in his book Seeing, Knowing and Believing (London, 1966)Google Scholar uses the notion of ‘simple seeing’ but describes it differently.

page 84 note 1 Mind (1965).Google Scholar

page 85 note 1 I quote this, with permission, from Professor Will's unpublished comments read at the Minneapolis meeting.

page 89 note 1 Austin, , Sense and Sensibilia, p. 100 ff.Google Scholar

page 90 note 1 See, for example, Anscombe, , Analytical Philosophy, p. 171.Google Scholar