Abstract
Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore.
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Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders (Belgium)
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Allo, P. LOGICAL PLURALISM AND SEMANTIC INFORMATION. J Philos Logic 36, 659–694 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9054-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9054-2