Skip to main content
Log in

Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A Case Study

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work has not met with any critical appraisal. It is argued that a reconsideration of the empirical results shows that bats are not boring automatons, driven by short input–output loops, instincts, and reflexes. Grounds are provided for thinking that bats satisfy a range of philosophically and scientifically interesting elaborations of the general idea that consciousness is best understood in terms of representational functions. A more complete examination of bat sensory capabilities suggests there is something that it is like after all. The discussion of bats is also used to develop an objection to strongly neurophilosophical approaches to animal consciousness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In addition to their intrinsic interest, our views on animal consciousness have obvious ethical ramifications.

  2. A certain degree of haziness might be unavoidable and there are probably many penumbral cases. Part of the difficulty might be that science-friendly philosophers are not always explicit about precisely how science sits within their epistemology of mind. Perhaps further work could help clarify what is at stake and where people stand. The present work itself, as one referee observed, is arguably some kind of neurophilosophy.

  3. Skepticism about bat consciousness, and indeed most animals, would seem to follow from higher-order accounts which are often assumed to imply that most, or perhaps all, non-humans are not conscious in virtue of the fact that they do not token beliefs about beliefs. Akins’ view is that bats (and presumably many other animals) do not token even primitive beliefs and desires, and so fail to satisfy the more generous interpretation of global availability offered by first-order representational accounts.

  4. And notwithstanding the presence of some highly selective auditory neurons, the bat’s brain may well also contain other populations sensitive to wider ranges of stimuli.

  5. Are cognitive maps necessary or sufficient for global representation? Perhaps they aren’t sufficient—a robot guided by GPS can navigate. Are they necessary? That’s also contentious since it depends on one’s theory of mental representation (e.g. are representations map-like or sentence-like?).

  6. I am indebted to Chris Stephens for this nuance in my interpretation of Akins.

  7. Johan Elköf deserves credit for the points made in this paragraph.

  8. Might this (finally) call for an application of “similarity-based” supervenience (Kim, 1987)?

  9. In answer to Block’s question “how can science based on us generalize to creatures that don’t share our physical properties?” (2002, p.16), it can be replied that they may nevertheless share our functional properties.

  10. Strawson was, of course, opposed to Quine on a range of fundamental issues, including the epistemic value of conceptual analysis and apriori philosophizing, the analytic-synthetic distinction, skepticism about meaning and reference, and, naturalized epistemology.

  11. Of course, what it is like to be pregnant would be left out, but noting that fact does no favors for Churchland’s argument.

References

  • Akins, K. (1993). What is it Like to be Boring and Myopic? In B. Dahlbom (Ed.), Dennett and His Critics (pp. 124–160). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Akins, K. (1996). A Bat Without Qualities. In M. Bekoff & D. Jamieson (Eds.), Readings in Animal Cognition (pp. 345–358). Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, C. (2010). “Animal Consciousness,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2012 edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.). <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/>.

  • Allen-Hermanson, S. (2008). Insects and the problem of simple minds: Are bees natural zombies? The Journal of Philosophy, 105(8), 389–415.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baars, B. J. (2005). Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 45–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bell, G. P., & Fenton, B. (1986). Visual acuity, sensitivity and binocularity in a gleaning insectivorous bat, Macrotus californicus (Chiroptera: Phyllostomidae). Animal Behavior, 34, 409–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bickle, J. (2005). Replies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(3): 285–296.

  • Bickle, J., Mandik, P., & Landreth, A. (2012). “The Philosophy of Neuroscience,” The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2012 edition), E. N. Zalta (Ed.). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/neuroscience/>.

  • Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (2002). The harder problem of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, 99, 391–425.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bradbury, J. W. (1969). The use of vision by the little brown bat, Myotis Lucifugus, under controlled conditions. Animal Behavior, 17, 480–485.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bradbury, J. W., & Vehrencamp, S. L. (1998). Principles of Animal Communication. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brook, A., & Mandik, P. (2007). The philosophy and neuroscience movement, Analyse & Kritik, 29(1): 3–23. <http://www.analyse-und-kritik.net/en/2007-1/AK_Brook_Mandik_2007.pdf>.

  • Buchler, E. R., & Childs, S. B. (1982). Use of the post-sunset glow as an orientation cue by big brown bats (Eptesicus Fuscus). Journal of Mammalogy, 63, 243–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P. (1992). The Animals Issue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Chase, J. (1981). Visually guided escape responses of microchiropteran bats. Animal Behavior, 29, 708–713.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chase, J., & Suthers, R. A. (1969). Visual obstacle avoidance by echolocating bats. Animal Behavior, 17, 201–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Childs, S. B., & Buchler, E. R. (1981). Perception of simulated stars by Eptesicus Fuscus (Vespertilionidae): A potential navigational mechanism. Animal Behavior, 29, 1028–1035.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. S. (1983). Consciousness: The transmutation of a concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 80–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chuchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. S. (1987). Epistemology in the age of Neuroscience. The Journal of Philosophy, 84(10), 544–553.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. S. (2005). A Neurophilosophical Slant on Consciousness Research. In V. A. Casagrande, W. R. Guillery, & S. Murray. Sherman (Eds.), Progress in Brain Research 149: Cortical function: A view from the thalamus (pp. 285–294). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dahlbom, B. (1993). Editor’s Introduction. In B. Dahlbom (Ed.), Dennett and his Critics (pp. 1–12). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins, R. (1986). The Blind Watchmaker. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1993). Back From the Drawing Board. In B. Dalhbom (Ed.), Dennett and His Critics (pp. 203–235). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1998). “Animal Consciousness: What matters and why”, Brainchildren: Essays on designing minds. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engelien, A., Huber, W., Silbersweig, D., Stern, E., Frith, C., Döring, W., et al. (2000). The neural correlates of ‘Deafhearing’ in man: Conscious sensory awareness enabled by attentional modulation. Brain, 123, 532–545.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuzessery, Z. M. (1986). Speculations on the role of frequency in sound localization. Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 28(1–3), 95–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R. (1988). Explaining Science: A cognitive approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gillett, G. R. (1991). The neurophilosophy of pain. Philosophy, 66(256), 191–206.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1985). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffin, D. R. (1992). Animal Minds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grunwald, J., Schörnich, S., & Wiegrebe, L. (2004). Classification of natural textures in echolocation. Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Sciences, 101(15), 5670–5674.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardcastle, V. (1997). When a pain is not. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(8), 381–409.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Joermann, G., Schmidt, U., & Schmidt, C. (1988). The mode of orientation during flight and approach to landing in two phyllostomid bats. Ethology, 78, 332–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keeley, B. L. (2002). Making Sense of the Senses: Individuating modalities in humans and other animals. In F. Macpherson (Ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 220–240). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (1987). ‘Strong’ and ‘Global’ supervenience revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48(2), 315–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kolb, B., & Whishaw, I. Q. (2003). Fundamentals of Human Neuropsychology. New York, NY: Worth Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Layne, J. N. (1967). Evidence for the use of vision in diurnal orientation of the bat Myotis Austroriparius. Animal Behavior, 15, 409–415.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (2006). Representational theories of consciousness, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 edition), E. N. Zalta (Ed.). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/consciousness-representational/>.

  • Macpherson, F. (Ed.). (2011). The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mandik, P. (2007). The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness. In M. Velmans & S. Schneider (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (pp. 418–430). New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Mandik, P. (2009). The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity. In John. Bickle (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience (pp. 601–618). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T. (1974/1998). “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (pp. 519–527). Cambridge: The MIT Press.

  • Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49, 329–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schnitzler, H. U., Moss, C. F., & Denzinger, A. (2003). From spatial orientation to food acquisition in echolocating bats. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 18(8), 386–394.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simmons, J. A. (2012). Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 22(2), 311–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simmons, J. A., Moss, C. F., & Ferragamo, M. (1990). Convergence of temporal and spectral information into acoustic images of complex sonar targets perceived by the echolocating bat, Eptesicus fuscus. Journal of Comparative Physiology A, 166, 449–470.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. New York: Doubleday and Co.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Suga, N. (1984) The extent to which biosonar information is represented in the bat auditory cortex, Dynamic aspects of neocortical function: 315–373.

  • Suthers, R. A. (1966). Optomotor responses by echolocating bats. Science, 152, 1102–1104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suthers, R. A., & Braford, B. (1969). Visual form discrimination by echolocating bats. Biological Bulletin, 137, 535–546.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson, G. (1984). Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat. Nature, 308, 181–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson, G. (1988). Reciprocal altruism in bats and other mammals. Ethology and Sociobiology, 9, 85–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I am in debt to Chris Stephens for his comments and criticism, as well as Brock Fenton and Johan Eklöf for lending their expertise and helping me cope with the empirical literature. I also thank the anonymous referees for their insightful feedback.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sean Allen-Hermanson.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Allen-Hermanson, S. Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A Case Study. Erkenn 80, 57–76 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9612-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9612-2

Keywords

Navigation