Abstract
The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption (or intuition) that (tangential qualifications aside) it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that (1) if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as a complicated distraction in the debate concerning cyclic preferences, and that (2) there is a way of understanding the argument that casts it as grounded in a less controversial starting point.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This illustration of cyclic preferences is also used in my manuscript “The Real Puzzle of the Self-Torturer: Uncovering a New Dimension of Instrumental Rationality.” While my focus here is on a thought experiment that is supposed to challenge the idea that cyclic preferences can be rational, my focus there is on a thought experiment that is supposed to support that idea.
For the original presentation of “the money-pump argument,” see (Davidson et al. 1955).
Johan Gustafsson’s related reasoning regarding the money-pump argument is touched on in note 6 below. See also, for example, (Levi 2002), wherein Isaac Levi characterizes money pump arguments as “designed” to show that individuals who violate “acyclicity of preference” will “end up choosing options that are dominated by other options available to them” (S241–S242).
This assumes that rationally uncriticizable agents will not face rational dilemmas in which every alternative is rationally impermissible. If, by contrast, such agents can face such dilemmas, then even a conclusive demonstration that an agent with cyclic preferences will wind up with a rationally impermissible alternative would not establish the irrationality of cyclic preferences.
Gustafsson (2013) seems to recognize this, but not as a reason to seek a more charitable interpretation of the money-pump argument; instead, he sees it as a reason to favor the "more direct synchronic argument" that zeros in on the idea that that it is irrational to choose in a way that realizes a dispreferred alternative. But, as we have seen, if the money-pump argument is interpreted as relying on this idea, it emerges as question-begging, and this adds to the case for seeking a more charitable interpretation.
References
Andreou, C. (2007). There are preferences and then there are preferences. In B. Montero & M. D. White (Eds.), Economics and the mind. New York: Routledge.
Davidson, D., McKinsey, J. C. C., & Suppes, P. (1955). Outlines of a formal theory of value, I. Philosophy of Science, 22, 140–160.
Gustafsson, J. E. (2013). The irrelevance of the diachronic money-pump argument for acyclicity. The Journal of Philosophy, 110, 460–464.
Levi, I. (2002). Money pumps and diachronic books. Philosophy of Science, 69, S235–S247.
McClennen, E. F. (1990). Rationality and dynamic choice. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schick, F. (1986). Dutch bookies and money pumps. The Journal of Philosophy, 83, 112–119.
Acknowledgments
My thanks to Donald Bruckner, Jonah Schupbach, and Mike White for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Andreou, C. Cashing out the money-pump argument. Philos Stud 173, 1451–1455 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0555-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0555-5