This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
See, for example, Nicholas Rescher,Pascal's Wager: A study of practical reasoning in philosophical theology (Notre Dame, 1985); George Schlesinger,New perspectives on old-time religion (Oxford, 1988), chap 6: ‘Pascal's Wager’; Thomas Morris,Anselmian explorations: Essays in philosophical theology (Notre Dame, 1987) chap. 11: ‘Pascalian Wagering’; Jeff Jordan, ‘Duff and the Wager’,Analysis 51 (1991): 174–176, ‘The manygods objection and Pascal's Wager’,International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991): 309–317, and ‘Pascal's Wager and the problem of infinite utilities’,Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993): 49–59; and Geoffrey Brown, ‘A defense of Pascal's Wager’,Religious Studies 20 (1985): 465–79.
An interesting objection, though undeveloped, is raised by Graham Oppy, ‘On Rescher on Pascal's Wager’,International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1990): 159–168, 162–163. He says that there is a partitioning problem in the assignment of probabilities. One has other options besides the two options of assigning finite or zero values for the probability of God's existence. One can also assign an infinitesimal value for that probability, and under that condition, Oppy claims, the expected utility will not be infinite. Oppy, however, fails to say anything that would make plausible or even intelligible the phenomenology of holding beliefs of infinitesimal probability. He is also mistaken in claiming that the expected utility will be finite. It may or may not. It all depends on how exactly the variables approach infinity, namely, how fast the probability moves toward zero and how fast the payoff moves toward an unbounded value.
Its best formulation is Michael Martin's in ‘Beneficial Arguments for God’, chap. 9 inAtheism: A philosophical justification (Philadelphia, 1990) and ‘Pascal Wager as an argument for not believing in God’,Religious Studies 19 (1983): 57–64. But see also Antony Flew, ‘Is Pascal's Wager the only safe bet’, chap. 5 inGod, freedom and immortality (Buffalo, NY, 1984); J. L. Mackie, ‘Belief without reason’, chap. 11 inThe miracle of theism (Oxford, 1982); Graham Oppy, ‘On Rescher on Pascal's Wager’; Larimore R. Nicholl, ‘Pascal's Wager: The bet is off’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1978–1979): 274–280; Peter Dalton, ‘Pascal's Wager: The second argument’,The Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (1975): 31–46; Terence Penelhum,Religion and rationality (New York, 1971): 215–216; R. G. Swinburne, ‘The Christian Wager’,Religious Studies 4 (1969): 217–228; Merle Turner, ‘Deciding for God: The Bayesian support of Pascal's Wager’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1968): 84–90; and James Cargile, ‘Pascal's Wager’,Philosophy 41 (1966): 250–257
‘The many-gods objection and Pascal's Wager’, p. 313.
For more on higher order degrees of belief, see Brian Skyrms,Pragmatics and empiricism (New Haven, 1984), pp.29–36.
Analysis 46 (1986): 107–109. An earlier version of this objection can be found in Cargile, ‘Pascal's Wager’, pp.253–254.
‘Duff and the Wager’, p. 174.
Rescher suggests this line of response to the many-gods objection inPascal's Wager: A study of practical reasoning in philosophical theology.
George Schlesinger suggests this line of response without defending it inReligion and scientific method (Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1977), p. 137, and inNew perspectives on old-time religion, pp. 154 and 156. Jeff Jordan defends this line of response, though in an unconvincing manner (‘The many-gods objection and Pascal's Wager’, pp.316–317, and ‘Pascal's Wager and the problem of infinite utilities’, p.53).
An exception is Richard Jeffrey,The logic of decision (2nd ed., Chicago, 1983), pp. 150–154.
‘Infini Rien’: Pascal's Wager and the human paradox (Carbondale, IL, 1993).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Anderson, R. Recent criticisms and defenses of Pascal's Wager. Int J Philos Relig 37, 45–56 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01314003
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01314003