Abstract
Historically, Thomas Aquinas has been controversial for his use of Averroistic-Aristotelian metaphysics. Because of his doctrine of simplicity many of argued that this entails a necessitarian view of nature—a debate that would pass through Spinoza, Descartes, and even to this day. Nevertheless, Thomas would prevail, not only to sainthood, but to become the patron of education and the Teacher of the Church. The task in this paper is to demonstrate that, contrary to many current contentions in Protestant, and especially Evangelical circles, Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics remains a suitable, viable, even preferable framework for Christian Theism and, for the purposes of this paper, scientific thought. The specific focus will be on creation metaphysics and the relationship between current science and Christian thought raised by Lydia Jaeger. I will conclude with an example of the ability of radical contingency in Thomas to both satisfy contemporary physics and frame a consistent and coherent Christian Theism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
What the Heavens Declare (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 66.
Jaeger, 101; Citing “On Being and Essence” in Selected Writings: The Principles of Nature, on Being and Essence, On the Virtues in General, On Free Choice, trans. Robert P. Goodwin, 52; Jaeger also cross-references this with Summa Theologica I, 12.4; and 14.1. Here Thomas argues that matter alone is not a principle of cognition [or intelligibility] bur rather matter and essence, which comprise form. Admittedly, Jaeger’s cross-reference in ST is not as evident in On Being and Essence but Thomas does make this metaphysical demarcation elsewhere. See De ente est essential, ch. 2. Summa Contra Gentiles II, 75. ST I, 86, 1 ad. 3; I, 105, 3, c. De spiritualibus creaturis 1, ad 12 and elsewhere throughout Thomas’ works.
Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science (New York: Routeledge, 2012), 42.
Ibid., 43.
Jaeger, 7–13, 50–51.
Rosenberg, 47.
Robin Collins, “God and the Laws of Nature,” Philo Vol. 12 No. 2 (2009): 2–3 (Preprint).
Bernard Berofsky, “The Regularity Theory,” Nous 2 no. 4 (1968): 316.
Collins, 4.
Historically, logical positivism dropped the philosophical contributions and had gotten closer to nomic necessity. This had entailments for property dispositions. When appealing to properties it is referring to realism, something that happens to the entities but particularly the properties. For the anti-realist dispositions are most fundamental aspects of reality. One cannot get more reductive than dispositions and necessity. Unless a necessitarian is prepared to say that the relation of necessity is actually observed in the instances of some law or describing certain properties, the inference to a necessary law creates the problem of inductive reasoning. Likewise, unless the appropriate necessary connections are postulated the fixed premises for deductive reasoning are not as firm as the logical positivist would like them to be. Then, logical positivists have sought to avoid nomic necessity due to the metaphysical problems imported with such explanations and causation. Thus, instrumentalism enters the scene. Since it seems nearly impossible to get to nomic necessity the positives adopted the instrumentalist or anti-realist position and considered that the next best option. If one has an adequate explanation that approximates the world then you have the conditions that bring an event about. The logical positivist breaks explanations down by conditions because they do not necessarily know what causality is metaphysically.
Bruce Gordon, “A Quantum-Theoretic Argument against Naturalism,” in The Nature of Nature. Eds. Bruce Gordon and William Dembksi (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2011), 181.
Jaeger, 50.
Ibid., 57.
See W. David Beck and Max Andrews, “God and the Multiverse: A Thomistic Modal Realism,” Philosophia Christi (Summer 2014): 101–15.
Jaeger, 10.
ST I, 15.3.
SCG I, 29.
Jaeger, 66.
Jerry Coyne, “Truckling to the Faithful: A Spoonful of Jesus makes Darwin Go Down,” posted on his blog Why Evolution is True on April 22, 2009, http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2009/04/22/truckling-to-the-faithful-a-spoonful-of-jesus-helps-darwin-go-down/ (accessed March 7, 2012).
Discovering the function of something is purely discovery it’s causal role in the macrocosm. Thus, causal role is equivalent to function and function is equivalent to teleology while teleology is underdetermined in definition because of the absence of efficient and final causation. Scientific explanation has traditionally been met with dissatisfaction by those who demand that such explanation show the purpose of natural processes and not just shows how they came to be. According to Rosenberg, teleological explanations are legitimate in the social sciences the natural sciences are bereft efficient and final causation. The why question is reduced to the how question and are equivocal in explanation. Rosenberg, 112-14.
Michael Williams, “Must Naturalists be Realists?” in The Nature of Nature. Eds. Bruce Gordon and William Dembksi (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2011), 251.
See Jaeger, 65–69 for her discussion of ceteris paribus laws and contingencies and 28–32 for her discussion concerning the problem of matter being foreign and opposed to God: “Their [matter and God] relationship is that of ‘opposite differences . . . one is pure act, the other is pure potency, and they agree in nothing. . .” (Citing Thomas, Quia Materia id Quod est, in Potentia est, I, XVII, 7).
Such as, “Contingency and Natural Law,” in Toward a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science and Faith ed. Ted Peters (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993); “Knotingenz der geschöpflichen Wirklichkeit” Theologische Literaturzeitung (1994); Systematic Theology (1994).
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 1 Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 380.
Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he (Aristotle) premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, “whether the world is eternal.”
Phys. 8, lectio 2, n. 974-5.
Albert Magnus and Thomas both endorsed the acceptance of an infinite series of accidental chains. However, for example, Thomas does not believe that there has in fact been an infinite chain of fathers and sons. Only Scripture can rule that out, not philosophy. ST 1.46.2, reply to 7th arg.; CG 2.38, reply to 5th arg.; Scriptum Super Libros Senentiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, in 2, dist. 1, quaest. 1, art. 5. Albert Magnus, in VIII Physicorum, tract 1, ch. 12.
Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lobardi, in 3, dist. 1.1, 2; ST I, 46.1, 2. Jaeger often cites Plato’s demiurge (e.g. p. 66). Plato’s demiurge does not create matter but only rearranges it. Aristotle’s mover moves preexistent matter. Avicenna finds the idea of a creator who genuinely accounts for existence without relying on something existent. Thomas developed this from Avicenna and Albert the Great and was later used by Peter of Auvergne. Thomas, though rooted in Platonic idea in history, doesn’t adopt a misconstrued doctrine of creation that is adulterated by Plato.
ST I, 19.7; cf. CG I, 83; 3.91; 98; 4.70.
A Muslim husband can say to his wife, “I divorce you—with effect from tomorrow”. It may then appear that the divorce will take effect tomorrow wit no further triggering events. But al-Ghazali points out, on behalf of his opponents, ‘the philosophers’, that even here the divorce depends on a further event, namely, the arrival of tomorrow. See Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut I, 11.5.
ST I, 46.1. arg 6. Although no known Latin translation of above-mentioned al-Ghazali’s work didn’t appear any earler than AD 1328 (after Thomas), but it appears Albert the Great, Thomas’ teacher, had knowledge of the work. Thomas states: A person who wishes to do something tomorrow, he says, has to wait at least for one change to occur: the arrival of tomorrow and the changes involved in that arrival. By the way, Boethius uses a similar argument and argues that by pointing out that if the universe has not been created there can be no such thing as the arrival of the right time, since no changes would be occurring.
Cael. I, lectio 29, n. 12; Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarium in 3, dist. 25.1.2, ad. 9; ST I, 32.1, ad. 3. Follows from Irenaus of Lyon [Lugdunum], Adversus Haereses 2.1.1; 2.30.9; 3.8.3 and Augustine, City of God XI.24. Also Basil, Ambrose, Aeneas of Gaza, and Zacharias.
Plotinus Enneads, 5.1.6.
ST I, 46.2.
Swinburne: You need to justify your claim that ‘for a constituent of the universe to be uncaused would mean that it is metaphysically necessary’. In the sense of ‘metaphysically necessary’ which I defined in Mind, Brain, and Freewill, that does not follow at all. Indeed, as you may know, my view is that it is not metaphysically possible for there to be a metaphysically necessary being in the sense required. But of course in my view we do need an explanation of the co-existence of a vast number of different things, and the most probable explanation of that is in terms of the agency of a simple thing – that is God. And hence of course I agree that there is a ‘abductive cosmological argument’ from the existence of the universe to God; but I think that it only gives a mild degree of probability to its conclusion, and so it needs to be backed up by many other arguments from the particular features of the universe.” (Private Correspondence with Richard Swinburne, 30 December 2013).
I greatly appreciate the referee and editorial team for the commentary and feedback in several aspects of this paper, making it much more robust. Similarly, I want to thank Tyler Dalton McNabb and W. David Beck.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Andrews, M.L.E. Scientia and Radical Contingency in Thomas Aquinas. Philosophia 43, 1–12 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9570-6
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9570-6