Conclusion
I have been experimental in my comparative approach, using the instrument of Hua-yen Buddhism to investigate Kant's ‘fact or reason’. What has been demonstrated? Certainly, the hypothesis that comparative study is flexible enough to illuminate strands of our own philosophical tradition is both interesting and compelling. But for Kant, does the study of practicability with reference to the buddhi-mind end in the perception of the dharmadhatu? I have marshalled some evidence to support this theory, implicit throughout the Second Critique. At the end of the Grundlagen, Kant offers one further note suggesting this conception must have been a continuing influence on his later moral thinking. Referring to the idea of a purely intelligible world, he says it serves to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the splendid ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational beings), to which we can belong as members only if we are scrupulous to live in accordance with maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.41
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Appelbaum, D. The fact of reason: Kant's prajna-perception of freedom. J Indian Philos 15, 87–98 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00213994
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00213994