Skip to main content
Log in

Making statements and approval voting

  • Published:
Theory and Decision Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aragones E., Postlewaite A. (2002) Ambiguity in election games. Review of Economic Design 7: 233–255

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow K. J. (1953) The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing, Econometrie; as translated and reprinted in 1964. Review of Economic Studies 31: 91–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brams S. J., Fishburn P. C. (1978) Approval voting. American Political Science Review 72: 831–847

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brams S. J., Fishburn P. C. (1983) Approval voting. Birkhauser, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Brams S. J., Fishburn P. C. (2005) Going from theory to practice: The mixed success of approval voting. Social Choice and Welfare 25(2): 457–474

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Amasio A. (1994) Descartes’ error. Putnam, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs A. (1957) An economic theory of democracy. Harper Collins Publishers, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Foa E. B., Feske U., Murdock T., Kozak M. J., McCarthy P. R. (1991) Processing of threat-related information in rape victims. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 100: 156–162

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frank R. H. (1988) Passions within reason: The strategic role of emotions. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • LeDoux J. E. (1996) The emotional brain. Simon and Schuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Lohmann S. (1993) A signaling model of informative and manipulative political action. American Political Science Review 87(2): 319–333

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lohmann S. (1994) Information aggregation through costly political action. American Economic Review 84(3): 518–530

    Google Scholar 

  • Pennebaker J. W., Barger S. D., Tiebout J. (1989) Disclosure of traumas and health among holocaust survivors. Psychosomatic Medicine 51: 577–589

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker W., Ordeshook P. (1968) The calculus of voting. American Political Science Review 62: 25–42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weber R. J. (1995) Approval voting. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 39–49

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Enriqueta Aragones.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Aragones, E., Gilboa, I. & Weiss, A. Making statements and approval voting. Theory Decis 71, 461–472 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5

Keywords

Navigation