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Abstract

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision.

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Notes

  1. John Sutton et al. (2010: 536) have pointed out that Sterelny’s account of the scaffolded mind offers the “same kind” of perspective as what they call the second wave of extended cognition based on the complementary principle: “in extended cognitive systems, external states and processes need not mimic or replicate the formats, dynamics, or functions of inner states and processes. Rather, different components of the overall (enduring or temporary) system can play quite different roles and have different properties while coupling in collective and complementary contributions to flexible thinking and acting” (Sutton 2010: 194). However, Sterelny’s (2004, 2010) avoidance of the term “mental extension” to name his approach, and his insistence that using this term has no explanatory gain, points to a key difference between both views.

  2. Wilson and Clark (2009) have developed a multidimensional model of EM to allow for casual, one-off use of external resources to count as cases of mind extension. However, I agree with Sterelny (2010) that there is no explanatory gain in treating the environment as part of the body or the mind in these cases. Most external mnemonic tools do not constitute stricto sensu parts of my mind, but they function as prosthetic support of my deficient inner memory (see Adams and Aizawa 2008: x, 12, 145).

  3. The cases that I will be considering are cases of memory retrieval when the answer does not pop up automatically. It seems that only in these cases does the subject have to choose between an internal and an external resource.

  4. One of the editors suggested that Otto would face the same problems as Inga (i.e., the selection and endorsement problems), if he relied on external resources other than his notebook, such as a cell phone. This seems right to me, but it should be noticed that in those cases Otto’s mind would not extend to the other resources unless he resorts to them as often as to his notebook. Of course, if Otto uses other external resources, he would confront the selection and endorsement problems. It should be noticed, however, that those cases are cases of mental scaffolding, not of mental extension.

  5. I call it the “extended selection problem” to distinguish it from the classic “selection problem”, which only considers internal resources. But by calling it “extended” I do not mean that this is a problem for EM cases in particular. As I said above, this problem does not arise for EM.

  6. One of the editors, as well as Kevin Reuter, asked me to explain whether these decisions need to be conscious to qualify as metacognitive. This is a difficult question and would deserve further investigation. So far, there is no consensus on this issue. On the on hand, Koriat has claimed that these decisions are conscious (Koriat 1993, 2000). Reder and her colleagues, on the other hand, have claimed that such decisions, and the feelings associated with them, are unconscious because they can shape subjects’ behavior very quickly; so it is unlikely that subjects are aware of their decisions and the feelings associated with them (Reder and Schunn 1996; Spehn and Reder 2000; Paynter et al. 2009; see also De Sousa 2008). The issue becomes even less clear when one considers philosophy. On the one hand, Ned Block (1995) has famously championed the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, which allows for phenomenal conscious experiences that the subject is unaware of; so the subject might be phenomenally conscious of her decision even though she is not able to report them. On the other hand, Carruthers (2009, 2011) and Daniel Wegner (2002) have recently claimed that subjects are never conscious of their decisions or decision-making processes, and they have amassed some empirical data to support this view. It is hard to give a straightforward answer to this question, given the great complexity of discussions about consciousness. What is clear from the experimental data on metacognition is that subjects are not behaving randomly, and this fact suggests some form of control or decision-making; whether this control is conscious or not is still matter of debate.

  7. Michaelian’s version of the problem focuses on the epistemological justification aspect of belief formation: “How can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in a justification-conferring manner?” (Michaelian 2012a). My account, however, focuses on the subjective decision to endorse a piece of information independently of the epistemological justification of the resulting belief. However, I am in agreement with the epistemological considerations developed in that paper.

  8. Mental and epistemic uncertainty differ from the feeling of uncertainty. A subject may be epistemically uncertain about the truth of a proposition (e.g., she may not know whether she is justified in believing p) without having a feeling of uncertainty. In contrast, she can feel uncertain even though she is justified in believing a given proposition.

  9. I use “knowledge” in the psychological sense, that is, to refer simply to the possession of a piece of information in the memory store, independently of this piece of information being true, justified or even endorsed.

  10. Some theorists, however, do not accept this view of metacognition as a mental mechanism that elicits metacognitive feelings. Most of these theorists hold that metacognition is a capacity that produces second-order thoughts about the self, and therefore they associate metacognition with mindreading (e.g., Carruthers 2009, 2011; for a criticism of the identification of mindreading and metacognition, see Proust 2007, 2012, forthcoming). As I said at the outset, I am mainly interested in the experience-based control account of metacognition, which is why I favor this view here. I defend the view in Arango-Muñoz (forthcoming).

  11. I endorse here Reder’s (1987, 1988, 1996) definition of the feeling of knowing: It is an experience a subject undergoes when she faces a question and is about to recall some information, but before the actual recall. For example, the experience that a subject undergoes when asked: “What is the capital of Spain?” Assuming that the subject has a feeling of knowing, the functional role of this experience is to indicate to the subject that she will be able to recall the appropriate information to answer the question and thus motivates her to recall it (“Madrid”) (Reder 1987, 1988, 1996). There is, nevertheless, some ambiguity in the literature about the use of this concept. Many researchers use it to mean the kind of feeling that a subject undergoes when, after failing to retrieve an item from memory, she still feels that it is stored in her memory (e.g., Hart 1965; Nelson and Narens 1990; Pannu and Kaszniak 2005). The latter experience is known as the tip of the tongue phenomenon (Schwartz 2002; Schwartz and Metcalfe 2010).

  12. The idea that concepts and theories are involved in metacognition is an old one: subjects use their conceptual capacities and their folk theories to evaluate their performance. However, until recently researchers were not entirely aware of the fact that the way you frame the questions in metacognitive tasks can change the results. Asking “are you sure you remember everything?” and “are you sure you are not forgetting something?” produces different judgments; the latter form leads to more accurate judgments (Finn 2008; Koriat et al. 2004).

  13. For the sake of simplicity, this is an oversimplification of how memory works. To get a more realistic view on memory see Loftus et al. 1996; Schacter and Addis 2007; Michaelian 2011, 2012b.

  14. This occurs when the answer pops up into the mind without the need for any retrieval attempt or further effort.

  15. Paynter et al. (2009) estimate that the production of the feeling takes place in the 300–500 ms time window, whereas the retrieval of an item from memory takes longer.

  16. The reader may feel uncomfortable with this case because I have been mainly discussing about semantic memory along the paper. I chose this example because it is more striking than the case of semantic memory. In Section 1, I gave a less picturesque example of a non-believed semantic memory: A subject retrieves from her memory “Sydney is the capital of Australia”, but she decides not to endorse it.

  17. Since I have relied heavily on Michaelian 2012a in discussing the problems and their solutions, I want to explain how our views fit together. We agree on the overall function of memory and metamemory. The main difference between our approaches concerns the role of metacognitive feelings: whereas for me they are the output of metacognition and the intermediaries of metacognitive decisions, they are deemphasized in Michaelian’s account, which focusses on heuristics and the resulting judgements. However, the two accounts may be compatible, as it seems likely that there is room for roles for both heuristics-based metacognitive judgements and metacognitive feelings in explaining how the selection and endorsement problems are solved.

  18. The correlation between confidence and memory accuracy seem to be disrupted in eyewitness memory reports (Krug 2007; Perfect 2004; Luna and Martín-Luengo 2012).

  19. Joëlle Proust has pointed out to me that it is debatable whether it is appropriate to call this experience “the feeling of truth” because it suggests that the feeling unveils the truth conditions of the proposition, and this seems too demanding for a feeling. I agree that the name may not be appropriate; the classic concept of “confidence” works better here.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to Ken Aizawa, Anne-Sophie Brüggen, Koosha Eghbal, Christoph Michel, Joëlle Proust, Kevin Reuter, Camilo Uribe “el Pájaro”, Tobias Schlicht, Richard Stockle-Schobel, and Eric Schwitzgebel for their corrections, comments, and suggestions. I would specially like to thank the editors John Sutton and Kourken Michaelian, and also to two anonymous reviewers for their thorough corrections, comments, and suggestions to a previous draft. Their suggestions greatly improved this paper.

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Arango-Muñoz, S. Scaffolded Memory and Metacognitive Feelings. Rev.Phil.Psych. 4, 135–152 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0124-1

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