Pluralism, Preferences and Deliberation: A Critique of Sen's Constructive Argument for Democracy
Journal of Social Philosophy, Forthcoming
23 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2013
Date Written: September 19, 2012
Abstract
In this paper we argue that Sen's defence of liberal democracy suffers from a moralistic and pro-liberal bias that renders it unable to take pluralism as seriously as it professes to do. That is because Sen’s commitment to respecting pluralism is not matched by his account of how to individuate the sorts of preferences that ought to be included in democratic deliberation. Our argument generalises as a critique of the two most common responses to the fact of pluralism in contemporary (i.e. post-Rawls) liberalism: a broadly procedural understanding of autonomy and the idea of deliberative democracy. That is to say, the difficulties with pluralism we identify can be traced back to the particular version of Kantian deontology prevalent in contemporary liberalism, and to the equally prevalent aspiration to ground political legitimacy in a moralised consensus.
Keywords: Sen, Pluralism, Preferences, Deliberative Democracy, Capabilities, Liberalism
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