Abstract
The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we do not need to assume that rationality is commonly known (as is done in [Aumann (1995)]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as done in [Samet (1996)]). The proposed model is compared with the account of hypothetical knowledge presented by Samet in [Samet (1996)] and with other possible strategies for extending information structures with conditional propositions.
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This research was funded by the National Science Foundation: “Game-Theoretic Foundation for Multi-Agent Systems”, IIS 9734923.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson
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Arló-Costa, H., Bicchieri, C. Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information. Stud Logica 86, 353–373 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9065-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9065-6