Summary
I have argued that CDT is a good rational decision theory; its use leads to the correct recommendations in problems where V-maximization goes wrong. Objections to K-expectation CDT were mentioned in Section 2, and I claimed that they would be answered by the foundation presented above. One of the objections was simply that CDT lacks the foundation that a representation theorem provides; this objection has now been met. Of course, we really seek a good foundation. If we are convinced that the theorem does follow from the axioms, that the uniqueness portion of the theorem is as strong as we would like it to be, and that the utility rule (7) is correct, the relevant question is: Are the conditions placed on rational preference systems by the axioms understandable, plausible, and not overly restrictive? The answer is yes, qualified by the acknowledgement that there are no doubt improvements to be found. Full justification of that answer requires a general discussion of formal, idealized treatments of rational preference and representation theorems for rational decision theory. Such a discussion appears in Armendt (1983). It also requires careful assessment of Axioms (1)–(11) given above; this also appears in Armendt (1983).
The other objections to K-expectation CDT mentioned in section 2 were directed toward the problem of the selection of appropriate K-partitions. These objections have been answered by the statement of the sufficient conditions for appropriate K's given in sections 4 and 5. (Notice that a statement of interesting necessary conditions is likely to be difficult; for a particular decision problem a partition of state descriptions might by coincidence yield an accurate evaluation of action A when used in rule (6) even though the partition fails to satisfy any intuitively correct conditions for appropriate K's). Those conditions describe, as they ought, the behavior of the K propositions in the agent's preferences. And the conditions are simple enough, clear enough, that partitions which satisfy them are readily found in decision problems which require their use.
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The ideas contained in this paper were presented and discussed in talks at the University of Minnesota at Duluth and Brown University; an early version of the paper was read at a conference on decision theory run by the Philosophy Department at Ohio State University in February, 1984. I benefited from each of those discussions. This paper is based on parts of my 1983 doctoral dissertation at the University of Illinois, Chicago. I especially thank Brian Skyrms and Paul Teller for their excellent criticisms and advice.
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Armendt, B. A foundation for causal decision theory. Topoi 5, 3–19 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137825
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137825