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Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?

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Abstract

Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his “Deflationary Truth and the Liar” (JPL 28:455–488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Wolfson College, Oxford University, UK

    Bradley Armour-Garb

  2. University of Connecticut, 344 Mansfield Rd, Storrs, CT, USA

    J. C. Beall

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  1. Bradley Armour-Garb
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Armour-Garb, B., Beall, J.C. Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30, 593–608 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013306202546

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