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Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (review)
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 25, Number 3, July 1987
- pp. 450-452
- 10.1353/hph.1987.0054
- Review
- Additional Information
- Purchase/rental options available:
45 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 25:3 JULY 198 7 of the composition of Notebook B by the time that Berkeley denied that power is a simple idea [in entry No. 493, i.e. at t3]" (xvii). Her new position that Berkeley finished Notebook B at ta--not at tx as was presumed in (i)---is further developed in her next suggestion that there is an "overlap in the original composition of the two notebooks," when Berkeley used both of them simultaneously for a while. She formulates her second conclusion as follows: "Accordingly [entry No. 493 on] fol. 23r [of Notebook A] gives a limit to the overlap in the original composition of the two notebooks" (xvii). In other words: (iv) Parts of Notebook A and Notebook B were written simultaneously up to the point of time when Berkeley wrote entry No. 493 at tv This implies that: (v) Berkeley finished Notebook B at ts. That is to say: (vi) Berkeley did not finish Notebook B at t, As (i) and (vi) contradict each other, there is no need to scrutinize the further details of her three-page argument. Nothing of importance has been shown to follow from Park's thesis concerning the original structure of the last pages of the present manuscript. It is to be regretted that Park makes little or no use of the extensive scholarly work on Berkeley's Philosophical Commentaries that has been done over the last eighty years. BERTIL BELFRAGE Lund University, Sweden. Robert J. Fogelin. Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. International Library of Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. Pp. xii + 195. $~5.oo As the title suggests, this book is a sustained discussion of skeptical arguments in Hume's Treatise. The author's aim is two-fold: he seeks to correct a perceived imbalance in the steady stream of commentary on Hume over the past few decades, an imbalance that overemphasizes Hume's naturalism at the expense of his skepticism; relatedly, the author wants to argue that Hume's Pyrrhonian skepticism can co-exist with his naturalism. The author clearly succeeds in the first task; the issue is much less clear with regard to the second aim. The opening chapter contains a useful taxonomy of different forms of skepticism . One important distinction is between theoretical skepticism and prescriptive skepticism. A theoretical skeptic challenges the grounds or warrant for some category of belief; he may not, however, prescribe or urge that we actually suspend belief about the relevant class of propositions. Fogelin argues that Hume's theoretical skepticism is wholly unmitigated; in this sense, Hume is a Pyrrhonian. Prescriptively, BOOK REVIEWS 451 however, Hume's skepticism is much more cautious and mitigated, what in the Enquiry he calls 'Academic skepticism'. The main grounds for Hume's Pyrrhonism, according to the author, are two skeptical arguments in Book I of the Treatise: (i) the argument of Part III, Section 6 about induction and (ii) the argument of Part IV, Section I about reason. Each argument is accorded sustained treatment by Fogelin, as is the skeptical argument about the senses in Part IV, Section ~ (which, Fogelin correctly points out, is misnamed since Hume argues that the relevant beliefs are false instead of unjustified). The book is rounded out by a discussion of germane issues raised by Hume's treatment of the self and the soul, reason and the passions, and reason and morals. Two appendices treat of controversial issues in the secondary literature on induction and Hume's regularity definition of causation. The distinction between theoretical and prescriptive skepticism sets the stage for a profound problem for Hume that Fogelin has not successfully resolved, viz. the apparent conflict between Hume's (theoretical) radical Pyrrhonism and his (prescriptive ) moderate Academic skepticism. This conflict can perhaps best be appreciated by considering Hume's argument about induction. Although Fogelin disagrees with other interpreters about the premises of this famous argument, he subscribes to the standard interpretation of the conclusion, to wit, that all inductive inferences issue in unwarranted or unjustified belief. (In one of the appendices he altogether too quickly dismisses a more moderate fallibilist interpretation of Hume's inductive skepticism...