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I would like to thank Dan Bonevac and Hans Kamp for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and the Center for Cognitive Science and the AI Lab at the University of Taxax at Austin for their generous research support.
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Asher, N. Semantic competence, linguistic understanding, and a theory of concepts. Philosophical Studies 53, 1–36 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355674
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355674