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Did he jump or was he pushed?

Abductive practical reasoning

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a particular role for abductive reasoning in law by applying it in the context of an argumentation scheme for practical reasoning. We present a particular scheme, based on an established scheme for practical reasoning, that can be used to reason abductively about how an agent might have acted to reach a particular scenario, and the motivations for doing so. Plausibility here depends on a satisfactory explanation of why this particular agent followed these motivations in the particular situation. The scheme is given a formal grounding in terms of action-based alternating transition systems and we illustrate the approach with a running legal example.

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Notes

  1. When speaking of persons we might call such a preference ‘character’ and may attempt to explain what kind of character the person has, cf. Walton (2007).

  2. We use ‘non-abductive’ instead of ‘deductive’ because deductive implies that normal practical reasoning is not presumptive/defeasible, which, of course, it is.

  3. Determining the audience given a VAF and an admissible set is computable in polynomial time (Bench-Copan 2007), so there are no complexity issues, even in large examples.

  4. The point that crimes invariably involve an abnormal or deviant motivation is made in Walton and Schafer (2006), which we will discuss further in Sect. 5.

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Correspondence to Trevor Bench-Capon.

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Bex, F., Bench-Capon, T. & Atkinson, K. Did he jump or was he pushed?. Artif Intell Law 17, 79–99 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-009-9074-z

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