Abstract
Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism (‘probability all the way down’) is augmented by the claim that probability cannot be turned into certainty, except by data that logically exclude all alternatives. Once we start being uncertain, no amount of updating will free us from the treadmill of uncertainty. This claim is cast first in objectivist and then in subjectivist terms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
D. Atkinson J. Peijnenburg (1999) ArticleTitle‘Probability as a Theory Dependent Concept’ Synthese 118 307–328 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005242414754
Jeffrey R.C.: 1965, The Logic of Decision, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, paperback edition, 1990
R.C. Jeffrey (1992) Probability and the Art of Judgement Cambridge Cambridge U. P.
Jeffrey, R. C.: 2001, ‘Epistemology Probabilized’, in: Johan van Benthem (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge. Proceedings of the Eighth Conference TARK 2001, July 8–10, 2001, Siena. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco.
C.I. Lewis (1946) An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation Open Court Illinois
Reichenbach, H.: 1938, Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Seventh impression, 1970.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Atkinson, D., Peijnenburg, J. Probability all the Way Up. Synthese 153, 187–197 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2723-1
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2723-1