Skip to main content
Log in

Peirce, Perry and the Lost History of Critical Referentialism

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper traces a lost genealogical connection between Charles S. Peirce’s later theory of signs and contemporary work in the philosophy of language by John Perry. As is shown, despite some differences, both accounts offer what might be termed a multi-level account of meaning. Moreover, it is claimed that by adopting a ‘Peircian turn’ in his theory, Perry might overcome alleged shortcomings in his account of cognitive significance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See (Perry 1977) and (Perry 1979) in particular.

  2. See for example Perry’s (1997a), (1997b), and (2001).

  3. Of course, as is well known, descriptivist accounts of names and indexicals fail for epistemological and metaphysical reasons, reasons which have largely been taken as reason for being a referentialist on such matters regardless of issues of cognitive significance.

  4. We seldom take ourselves to be saying anything about the sentences we are uttering when we say such things as 1. – 4. This is the prime argument against Reichenbach’s (1947) token-reflexivity account of indexicals.

  5. Peirce scholars will be aware that, strictly speaking, Peirce thinks that signs as a whole do not signify. Rather, some limited part of the sign will signify. For example, a color swatch will signify in virtue of its color, not its shape or size etc. This led Peirce to speak of the ground of the sign or the sign-vehicle, amongst other terminology, rather than the sign. For the sake of simplicity and ease of exposition, I don’t use this distinction here.

  6. Peirce also thought that signs signified two objects: the actual mind independent object, which he called the dynamic object; and that object as we are able to conceive of it, which he called the immediate object. I shall not examine this part of Peirce’s later semiotic.

  7. As this may suggest, Peirce’s later multiplication of interpretants is connected to his famous account of inquiry, whereby scientific investigation will lead us, at the end of inquiry, to a complete body of truths and an accurate account of reality. I do not want to pursue this connection here but see, for instance, T.L. Short’s (2004) for a useful account of Peirce’s later sign theory where its teleological/inquiry driven aspect is made clear.

  8. What is also interesting here is that this also suggests that Peirce’s final interpretant has more in common with the referentialist notions of propositions than with Fregean propositions, or ‘thoughts’. We can see this since 1 and 2. generate only one referential proposition, one final interpretant, but two Fregean ‘thoughts’ (since ‘Bob’ and ‘I’ have different Fregean senses). If the final interpretant relied on mediated reference, as with the Fregean ‘Thought’, we can assume that 1 and 2 would generate different final interpretants.

  9. Also interesting is that Perry makes no mention of the Peircian background to Burks’ work.

  10. For more on Burks approach use and appreciation of Peirce’s account of indexical signs, see (Atkin 2005).

  11. See for instance (Short 2004) for this change in Peirce’s account.

  12. As a matter of fact, Peirce was quick to recognize that he had earlier noted different types of understanding in outlining his three grades of clarity in his famous 1878 paper “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (W3, 257–275). According to this paper, clear understanding of a concept requires, quotidian familiarity with it, the ability to offer a general definition of it, and knowing what effects to expect from holding it true. The latter, of course is his famous Pragmatic Maxim. Peirce explicitly connects these grades of clarity with the three types of interpretant in his (CP8.185 (1909)).

  13. Initially Josiah Royce took control of the Peirce papers but died shortly afterwards. C.I. Lewis then took over editorship, but made little progress with the manuscripts before relinquishing responsibility for them. For the peculiar history of Peirce’s Manuscripts, see (Houser 1992).

  14. Burks is, of course, a central figure in Peirce scholarship generally and is responsible for editing the final two volumes of The Collected Papers in 1958.

  15. There are many ways in which we can come to understand objects, and so many different potential dynamic interpretants.

  16. See (Atkin 2008) for more on the connections between Peirce’s later account of signs and Frege’s Sense/Reference distinction.

References

  • Atkin, A. (2005). Peirce on the index and indexical reference. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, XLI(1):161–188.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkin, A. (2008). Peirce’s final account of signs and the philosophy of language. Transactions of The Charles S. Peirce Society, in press.

  • Burks, A. (1949). Icon, index, symbol. Philosophical and phenomenological research, 9, 673–689.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corazza, E. (2003). Review of John Perry’s “Reference and Reflexivity”. Mind, 112, 171–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M. (1981). Frege’s philosophy of language, 2nd edition.. London: Duckworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. (1892). On sense and reference. In P. Geach, & M. Black (Eds.) Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege (p. 1960). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardwick, C. (ed). (1977). Semiotics and significs. Charles Hardwick. Bloomington IN.: Indiana University Press.

  • Hookway, C. (1985). Peirce. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Houser, N. (1992). The fortunes and misfortunes of the peirce papers. In M. Balat, & J. Deledalle-Rhodes (Eds.) Signs of Humanity, vol 3 (pp. 1259–1268). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein (Eds.) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: O.U.P.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peirce, C. S. (1931–36). The collected papers. Volumes 1–6. (Eds.) Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press.

  • Peirce, C. S. (1958). In A.Burks (Ed.) The collected papers. Volumes 7 & 8. Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press.

  • Peirce, C. S. (1982 –) The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. (Eds.) M. Fisch, C. Kloesel, E. Moore, N. Houser et al. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.

  • Perry, J. (1977). Frege on demonstratives. The philosophical review, 86(4), 474–497.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Nous, 13, 3–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. (1997a). Reflexivity, indexicality and names. In W. Kunne, M. Anduschus, & A. Newen (Eds.) Direct reference, indexicality, and propositional attitudes. Cambridge: CSLI and Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. (1997b). Indexicals and demonstratives. In B. Hale, & C. Wright (Eds.) A companion to the philosophy of language. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. (2001). Reference and reflexivity. Stanford C.A: CSLI.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reichenbach, H. (1947). Elements of symbolic logic. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reimer, M. (2002). Review of John Perry’s “Reference and Reflexivity”. Notre dame philosophical reviews. June 2006.

  • Savan, D. (1988). An introduction to C.S. Peirce's full system of semeiotic. Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle.

    Google Scholar 

  • Short, T. (2004). The development of Peirce’s theory of signs. In C. Misak (Ed.) The Cambridge companion to Peirce. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soames, S. (2008). Analytic philosophy in America. In C. Misak (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of American philosophy. Oxford: O.U.P. In press.

  • Wettstein, H. (1986). Has semantics rested on mistake. The journal of philosophy, 53(4), 185–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Albert Atkin.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Atkin, A. Peirce, Perry and the Lost History of Critical Referentialism. Philosophia 36, 313–326 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9118-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9118-8

Keywords

Navigation