Abstract
Millianism is the familiar view that some expressions, such as proper names, contribute only their referent to the semantic content of sentences in which they occur. Inan (Philosophical Studies 2010) has recently argued that the Millian is committed to the following odd conclusion: There may be questions that he is able to grasp but that he cannot answer, either affirmatively, negatively, or with a simple “I don’t know”. The Millian is indeed committed to this conclusion. But we intend to show that Inan’s argument generalizes, so that everyone who accepts certain largely uncontroversial principles is committed to the odd conclusion that there may be questions that are graspable but not answerable.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
Strictly, this is entailed by Millianism taken together with the principle that synonymous expressions are substitutable salva veritate. This principle is largely uncontroversial, though there are those, such as Putnam (1954) and Fodor (1990), who deny it. Note that this principle is entailed by the principle that synonymous expressions are substitutable salva significatione, which becomes relevant later in the present paper. See n. 2.
Put differently, SP2 says that synonymous expressions are substitutable salva significatione. This principle is not explicitly mentioned in Kripke (1979), but it seems to be required to generate his puzzle.
Pierre could try to arrive at this conclusion by means of DP, but this would lead to difficulties. For example, Pierre could reason as follows: “If ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are synonymous, then by SP2 it follows that ‘Londres est jolie’ and ‘London is pretty’ are synonymous. Since I know that I assent to the former sentence, I know by DP that I believe the proposition expressed by the former sentence. But if that proposition is the same as the proposition expressed by the latter sentence, it follows that I know that I believe the proposition expressed by the latter sentence”. But this last bit of reasoning is dubious. If the proposition expressed by “Londres est jolie” is the same as that expressed by “London is pretty”, then it is clear that Pierre believes the former proposition only if he believes the latter proposition. But it is far from clear that Pierre knows that he believes the former proposition only if he knows that he believes the latter proposition. For there are apparent cases in which a believer knows that he believes p yet fails to know that he believes q, in spite of the fact that p is identical with q. Suppose that Smith’s favorite proposition is identical with the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4. Suppose that Jones knows that he himself believes that 2 + 2 = 4. Does it follow that Jones knows that he believes Smith’s favorite proposition? It seems not.
For the record, Putnam (1954) and Fodor (1990) both suggest alternative principles of compositionality. Putnam suggests that the meaning of a sentence is determined partly by its logical structure. Fodor suggests that the meaning of a belief ascription is determined partly by which specific expression occurs in its subordinate clause. In Fodor’s terminology, when an expression occurs in the subordinate clause of a belief ascription, it semantically contributes not only its content, but also the vehicle that it displays.
This claim is groundless in our opinion, but it has been accepted by many prominent philosophers, including Dummett (1978, p. 131), who holds that meaning must be “transparent”. Indeed, as Devitt (1996, pp. 171–179) has pointed out, this claim seems to be the basis of the Fregean contention that differences in cognitive significance entail differences in meaning. Thanks to an anonymous referee for stressing this point and providing references.
We are intentionally echoing Kripke’s (1979, pp. 256–257) argument that it cannot be Pierre’s past that prohibits him from having the belief that London is not pretty.
See Kripke (1979, pp. 260–261).
See Kripke (1979, pp. 262–263).
References
Devitt, M. (1996). Coming to our senses: A naturalistic program for semantic localism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dummett, M. (1978). Truth and other enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. (1990). The substitution argument and the individuation of beliefs. In G. Boolos (Ed.), Meaning and method: Essays in honor of Hilary Putnam (pp. 63–79). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inan, I. (2010). Unanswerable questions for Millians. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9515-2.
Kripke, S. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and use (pp. 239–283). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Putnam, H. (1954). Synonymy and the analysis of belief sentences. Analysis, 14, 114–122.
Rieber, S. (1992). Understanding synonyms without knowing that they are synonymous. Analysis, 52, 224–228.
Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Salmon, N. (1990). How to become a Millian heir. Nous, 23, 211–220.
Acknowledgment
We are indebted to Nathan Salmon, Ian Nance, Ilhan Inan and an anonymous referee.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Atkins, P., Lewis, T. Unanswerable questions for everyone: reply to Inan. Philos Stud 161, 263–271 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9733-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9733-2