Abstract
The potential for dual use of research in the life sciences to be misused for harm raises a range of problems for the scientific community and policy makers. Various legal and ethical strategies are being implemented to reduce the threat of the misuse of research and knowledge in the life sciences by establishing a culture of responsible conduct.
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Notes
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Article I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.
THE US BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1989 Sec. 175. Prohibitions with respect to biological weapons (a) IN GENERAL: Whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both. There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section committed by or against a national of the United States. (b) DEFINITION: For purposes of this section, the term ‘for use as a weapon’ does not include the development, production, transfer, acquisition, retention, or possession of any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.
The term “dual use” throughout this paper refers specifically to the generation and dissemination of legitimate scientific knowledge that could be misused for biological weapons development and production. It is not here used to refer to research that has a malevolent purpose and is being cloaked behind the guise of legitimate research activities.
The proposed criteria for dual use research of concern can be found in a draft report of a working group of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) presented and discussed at the April 19, 2007 meeting of the NSABB. http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/NSABB%20Draft%20DUR%20Ov%20Framewk8%20for%20public%20posting%20041907%20mtg2.pdf.
The clear-and-present-danger doctrine derives from the U.S. Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919)—“the words are used in such circumstances and of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” IT was later argued that the threshold should be imminent rather than present danger—“produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that will bring about … certain substantive evils.”
In January 2003, Thomas Butler reported 30 vials of plague missing from his laboratory at Texas Tech. The Justice Department charged Butler of illegal transportation of plague samples, tax evasion, fraud, and embezzlement. The prosecution of Butler was met with disapproval by many groups of scientists. Despite protests from the scientific community Butler was convicted on 1 December 2003 of 47 of the 69 charges filed against him. Of the convictions, three were for improper shipment of plague samples to collaborators in Tanzania.
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Atlas, R.M. Responsible Conduct by Life Scientists in an Age of Terrorism. Sci Eng Ethics 15, 293–301 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-009-9124-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-009-9124-7