Abstract
Sciences able to identify appropriate analytical units for their domain, their natural kinds, have tended to be more progressive. In the biological sciences, evolutionary natural kinds are adaptations that can be identified by their common history of selection for some function. Human brains are the product of an evolutionary history of selection for component systems which produced behaviours that gave adaptive advantage to their hosts. These structures, behaviour production systems, are the natural kinds that psychology seeks. We argue these can be identified deductively by classing behaviour first according to its level of behavioural control. Early animals in our lineage used only reactive production, Vertebrates evolved motivation, and later Primates developed executive control. Behaviour can also be classified by the type of evolutionary benefit it bestows: it can deliver either immediate benefits (food, gametes), improvements in the individual’s position with respect to the world (resource access, social status), or improvements in the ability to secure future benefits (knowledge, skill). Combining history and function implies the existence of seven types of behaviour production systems in human brains responsible for reflexive, instinctual, exploratory, driven, emotional, playful and planned behaviour. Discovering scientifically valid categories of behaviour can provide a fundamental taxonomy and common language for understanding, predicting and changing behaviour, and a way of discovering the organs in the brain––its natural kinds––that are responsible for behaviour.
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Notes
Movement can be of the whole body, of body parts (e.g., swimming, tail-flicking, flint-knapping), or ejections of matter or energy into the environment from inside the body (e.g., defecation, speech). Behaviour must be self-powered (i.e., locomotory) rather than dependant on external forces (e.g., drifting in a current of water or air). We do not count physiological movements such as heart-beats or peristalsis as behaviour because they do not interact with the environment. Such internal movements are also controlled by the autonomous nervous system rather than the central nervous system, and so are independently regulated.
The behaviour production unit lets animals turn salient external and internal stimuli into adaptive outputs or behaviour. We have thus set aside input side topics such as sensation, perception, categorization and concept discrimination. We similarly also avoid issues such as selection among competing behavioural options and motor control on the output side. Finally, we have set aside, at least for the moment, some of the special complexities of human behaviour––difficult issues such as temperament, mood, expression, and the role of culture. For the most part, these either modulate processes we do discuss or are late additions to behaviour production units.
Since behaviour does not fossilise, we cannot reconstruct the behavioural abilities of our ancestors directly; we can only make inferences based on extant animals that may, or may not, be representative of the behavioural capabilities at a certain point in our evolutionary past, given that contemporary species have had many millions of years (in some cases) to evolve new abilities. Our argument regarding the timing of new types of production systems is based not on the most advanced contemporary exemplar in some clade, but rather on the inferred qualities of a prototypical ancestral species in that group.
Just about any behaviour is likely to be accompanied by learning. The knowledge acquired in this way can modify the way in which a particular BPU works in future. However, this does not make all behaviour aptitudinal in our sense because the primary function of those behaviours is to achieve other kinds of end-states, rather than being devoted to learning per se.
Experimental psychologists nowadays avoid use of the word ‘drive’, largely because a number of results have been interpreted as refuting Hull’s classic drive reduction theory (Hull 1943). However, in each case, these experimental results can be interpreted as ‘tricking’ the reward system in a way which natural selection cannot be expected to have foreseen. First, rats will work to obtain saccharine rewards even when not calorie deficient (i.e., not in a state of ‘hunger’) (Sheffield and Roby 1950). However, saccharine constitutes an artificial, non-nutritive source of sweet taste, which is a proximal cue of ripe fruit in an animal’s evolved niche. Second, hungry rats will work to obtain direct electrical stimulation of their mesotelencephalic dopamine system, even over the option to receive food (Olds and Milner 1954; Routtenberg and Lindy 1965). This surgical procedure short-circuits the evolved reward system; selection is unlikely to predict a technology which provides rewards in the absence of the requisite biological resources following behaviour. Showing that maladaptive outcomes can be obtained through such artificial procedures does not refute the validity of the general claim that drives have evolved to produce need-directed behaviour which improves an animal’s fitness, and that such behaviour tends to appropriately manage internal resource levels under ‘natural’ ecological conditions.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Adam Biran, Kalina Christoff, Barbara Findlay, Carlos Gershenson, Ara Norenzayan, John Odling-Smee, Miguel Rubio-Godoy, Thomas Reydon, Beth Scott, Szymon Wichary and several anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions.