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Character in Epistemology

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Abstract

This paper examines the claim made by certain virtue epistemologists that intellectual character virtues like fair-mindedness, open-mindedness and intellectual courage merit an important and fundamental role in epistemology. I begin by considering whether these traits merit an important role in the analysis of knowledge. I argue that they do not and that in fact they are unlikely to be of much relevance to any of the traditional problems in epistemology. This presents a serious challenge for virtue epistemology. I go on to examine the work of two other virtue epistemologists in light of this challenge and then sketch an alternative approach that reveals how the intellectual virtues might merit a substantial role in epistemology even if not a role in connection with more traditional epistemological projects.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, One LMU Drive, Los Angeles, CA, 90045, USA

    Jason S. Baehr

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  1. Jason S. Baehr
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Correspondence to Jason S. Baehr.

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Baehr, J.S. Character in Epistemology. Philos Stud 128, 479–514 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7483-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7483-0

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