Abstract
Hans Reichenbach introduced two seemingly separate sets of distinctions in his epistemology at different times. One is between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connections. The other distinction is between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The status and nature of each of these distinctions have been subject-matter of an ongoing debate among philosophers of science. Thus, there is a significant amount of works considering both distinctions separately. However, the relevance of Reichenbach’s two distinctions to each other does not seem to have enjoyed the same amount of interest so far. This is what I would like to consider in this paper. In other words, I am concerned with the question: what kind of relationship is there between his two distinctions, if there is any?
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An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the conference, A Philosopher of Science in Istanbul: Hans Reichenbach, Bogazici University, May 8–9, 2008.
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Bagce, S. Reichenbach on the relative a priori and the context of discovery/justification distinction. Synthese 181, 79–93 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9588-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9588-7