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The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism

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Abstract

Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall argue that expressivism does not have the resources to adequately account for ethical vagueness, while cognitivism does. This demonstrates an advantage that cognitivism holds over expressivism.

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Notes

  1. See especially Aristotle (2002) 1094b, 12-18.

  2. See Constantinescu (Forthcoming); Schiffer (2003); Shafer-Landau (1995); (1994).

  3. I will solely focus on full non-cognitivist versions of expressivism and will not discuss hybrid theories.

  4. See Ayer (1936); Hare (1952); Stevenson (1944). For a discussion concerning emotivism and ethical vagueness see Sorensen (1990).

  5. D’Arms and Jacobson (2000) maintain that all neo-sentimentalists adopt RDT, including both cognitivist and non-cognitivist. See McDowell (1997a); (1997b); Wiggins (1997); Blackburn (1998); (1993); Gibbard (2003); (1990).

  6. See Gibbard (2003); (1990); Blackburn (1998); (1993). For a new discussion of expressivism and truth see Schroeder (2010).

  7. Different theorists account for these features in different ways, but the particular variations are not relevant for the purposes of this paper. What is relevant is that expressivists attempt to provide a normative framework that can mesh with logical systems to overcome the otherwise devastating Frege-Geach problem. For discussions of the Frege-Geach problem see Unwin (1990); Shroeder (2008); Dreier (2006).

  8. See Williamson (1994); Sorensen (1988).

  9. See Lewis (1982); Fine (1975); Tye (1989); Rosen and Smith (2004); Hyde (2008); Schiffer (2010).

  10. Note that some philosophers maintain that the kind of uncertainty we face when we encounter the phenomenon of vagueness is unique and it cannot be captured in terms of standard degrees of belief. See Schiffer (2003); Wright (2001).

  11. It is an interesting question as to just how fine grained conative states can be. If they are not as fine-grained as degrees of belief, then this would be a serious problem for expressivists. Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson raise a similar concern (2009).

  12. Michael Smith first introduced this problem (2002). Feeling the force of this problem some expressivists have opted to adopt hybrid accounts in which there are cognitive and non-cognitive features in normative judgments. I will not discuss these views in this paper since I am primarily concerned with purely non-cognitive versions of expressivism. For hybrid views see Lenman (2003); Ridge (2007). For criticisms of these views see Bykvist and Olson (2009).

  13. These are Smith’s terms (2002).

  14. See Smith (2002), pg. 317-318.

  15. See Smith (2002), pg. 317-318.

  16. Bykvist and Olson (2009), pg. 206.

  17. Andrew Sepielli discusses a similar maneuver (2012).

  18. Sepielli raises this worry (2012), pg. 199–200.

  19. Indeterminacy is also distinct from underdetermination, but this distinction is not relevant for the purposes of this paper.

  20. Indeterminacy has played a number of explanatory roles in ethics. It has been used to explain the general phenomenon of vagueness. See Shafer-Launau (1995); Railton (1992). Additionally, some moral realists have argued that indeterminacy provides an explanation for the seemingly intractable nature of ethical disagreement. Shafer-Landau (1994). pg. 336.

  21. See Rosen and Smith (2004); Hyde (2008); Schiffer (2010).

  22. For discussions of supervaluationism see Lewis (1982); Fine (1975); Tye (1989).

  23. Gibbard (1990), pg. 72.

  24. For a related discussion on vagueness and moral dilemmas see Sorensen (1991).

  25. Schroeder (2008), pg. 167.

  26. In Schroeder (2008) this state is called ‘disacceptance’, but in Schroeder (2010) something similar to this state is called to as ‘rejection’.

  27. Schroeder (2008), pg. 102–103.

  28. Schroeder (2008), pg. 108–113.

  29. See Schroeder (2008), pg. 102; (2010).

  30. Schroeder (2008), pg. 102.

  31. Schroeder (2008), pg. 113–115.

  32. Sainsbury (1997), pg. 251.

  33. Shafer-Landau uses a similar example for different purposes (1995), pg. 88.

  34. See Schiffer (2003). See also Wright (2001).

  35. I thank Chad Carmichael for this point.

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Acknowledgments

I received helpful feedback presenting versions of this paper at the University of Missouri in St. Louis Graduate Conference, the Illinois Philosophical Association, the University of Southern California-University of California, Los Angeles Graduate Conference, and the British Society for Ethical Theory. I thank the following individuals for their help with this paper: Nate Adams, Chad Carmichael, Anna Christensen, Christian Constantinescu, Mike Dacey, Jeff Dauer, Tom Dougherty, Jason Gardner, David Johnson, Sarah Malanowski, Tyler Paytas, Katie Rapier, Felipe Romero, Gillian Russell, Roy Sorensen, Bryan Stagner, Christopher Heath (Kit) Wellman, Isaac Wiegman, Eric Wiland, Gary Williams. I would also like to extend a very special thank you to Charlie Kurth, who has read countless drafts and encouraged me to pursue this project.

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  1. The Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO, 63130-4899, USA

    Nicholas Baima

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Baima, N. The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 593–605 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9493-0

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