Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of the indispensability argument. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
CITATION STYLE
Baron, S. (2013). A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. Synthese, 190(12), 2413–2427. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9989-2
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