Border Communities and Royce: The Problem of Translation and Reinterpreting Feminist Empiricism
Rent from DeepDyve- Border Communities and Royce:The Problem of Translation and Reinterpreting Feminist Empiricism
Contemporary feminist epistemologists have been concerned with understanding how knowledge is construed within empiricist frameworks (science) of knowledge or developing (anti-empiricist) "standpoint epistemologies." Latina feminist theorists, such as Ofelia Schutte and Gloria Anzaldúa, have contributed much to the discussion calling for a "new kind of consciousness," which seeks a way to understand the experiences of the marginalized without falling into the conceptual pitfall of assimilation, which has been a concern in standpoint epistemology. Additionally, this perspective seeks to maintain a coherent theory of knowledge that avoids relativism. My main attempt in this article is to bring feminist border politics into discussions with feminist empiricist theories of knowledge through the works of Josiah Royce. I show how Royce's theory of the role of interpretation in the processes of knowledge offers a theoretical interpretive tool for feminist empiricism to understand the issues raised in feminist border politics.
This article examines the works of W. V. Quine and Royce in light of the questions raised from the works of Schutte and Anzaldúa regarding the problem of translation and understanding difference. I first introduce the concerns raised by Schutte and Anzaldúa as to how theories of knowledge operate in a dyadic structure utilizing a binary logic. I argue that these theorists come from a particular theoretical location, namely, the borderlands, which seeks to discursively undermine the dichotomization of knowledge and create new ways of understanding the incommensurabilities of experience. Second, in light of Lynne Hankinson Nelson's attempts to use Quine's holistic theories in feminist empiricism in order to challenge current scientific methods, I discuss "recalcitrant experience," as Quine understands it, and the implications of this type of experience, as seen in his discussion regarding the problem of translation and the indeterminacy of language. Third, I introduce Royce's theory of interpretation as a necessary third process in order to understand recalcitrant experience in generating knowledge claims. This challenges Quine's dyadic formation in the processes of knowledge and also avoids the assimilation of recalcitrant experience. Finally, I argue that Royce's [End Page 12] theory of interpretation challenges the dyadic structure in Quine's empiricism and introduces a triadic structure of knowledge, which consequently allows the concerns of Schutte and Anzaldúa to take place within feminist empiricist discussions of knowledge. This perspective will enable empiricism to develop a new and a more culturally sensitive way of thinking about the world.
Avoiding Assimilation and Relativism: Recognizing Cross-Cultural Incommensurability
Questions regarding cross-cultural relations and possibilities of incorporating intersectionalities of differences in theory are common concerns for feminist border theorists. These questions are important in philosophy not only because they challenge the ways people of different cultures, social positions, and backgrounds interact with each other but also because these questions challenge how theories are formed about the world. In order to get a better understanding of how feminist border theorists contribute to theories about the world, I discuss two important arguments underlying the works of Ofelia Schutte and Gloria Anzaldúa.
First, Schutte argues for a principle of incommensurability that must be recognized in cross-cultural language exchanges. She points out that there is a "residue of meaning that will not be reached in cross-cultural endeavors" (2001, 49). However, instead of disregarding this meaning, which is determined by the specific cultural difference, Schutte describes these incommensurabilities as "sites of appreciation" (2001, 51). One way of commonly conceiving incommensurability is "arithmetically": "What I get from the differently situated speaker is the conveyable message minus the specific cultural difference that does not come across. Theorized in this manner, the way to maximize intercultural dialogue would be to devise a way to put as much meaning as possible into the plus side of the exchange, so as little as possible remains on the minus side" (Schutte 2001, 49). Moreover, this quantitative description of incommensurability, as Schutte argues, does nothing to further understand what cultural difference is. For Schutte, incommensurability resonates a kind of "strangeness," a "displacement of the usual expectation." Taking into account the cultural differences of others, one does not "bypass these...
