Review of: Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism, London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group (2011). The New Intuitionism refers to a strand of moral intuitionism recently developed by Robert Audi (2004), designed to overcome some of the shortcomings of early 20th century theories of moral intuitionism, such as those of G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross. Moral intuitionists believe that morality is objective, factual, and that one can acquire moral knowledge primarily by consulting one’s moral intuitions. The New Intuitionism, edited by Jill Graper Hernandez, is a collection of articles dedicated to discussing elements of Audi’s theory, the majority of which were conceived at a symposium held in his honor. The essays will be of interest especially to those working on moral epistemology. The New Intuitionism includes ten essays. Robert Audi begins with a short overview, and ends the volume with a more detailed essay outlining the main elements of his view. Two of the essays present arguments against elements of moral intuitionism. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong reformulates an earlier challenge of his (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006) to Audi’s intuitionism. According to intuitionists like Audi, moral intuitions can non-inferentially justify (at least some) moral beliefs. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that recent discoveries by empirical psychologists render this view untenable. Roger Crisp had previously argued that moral peer disagreement presents a challenge to moral intuitionism (Crisp, 2007). Here Crisp defends his argument against the critiques of Robert Audi and Ralph Wedgwood. Hugh J. McCann argues that moral intuitionism should be expanded to include moral conative experience as an essential source of moral knowledge, rather than limiting moral intuitions to the cognitive alone. McCann’s view is in continuum with Audi’s, who mentions more than once the role of emotion in acquiring moral knowledge (Audi, 2004). Christopher B. Kulp offers a defense of moral realism on the basis of some strongly held (first order) moral intuitions. Carla Bagnoli brings to light a contrast between Audi’s ‘Kantian intuitionism’ and Kant’s original theory. For Audi, moral knowledge can be particular, general principles coming later as systematizations of particular truths; while for Kant, genuine moral knowledge can only be knowledge of principles. Clayton Littlejohn defends moral intuitionism by rebutting three counter arguments and discussing one argument for moral intuitionism. Finally, two essays discuss general epistemological issues indirectly related to moral intuitionism. Ralph Kennedy discusses Audi’s theory of perception, comparing and contrasting it with that of Ernest Sosa. Peter Graham offers his analysis of some important epistemological concepts such as entitlement and justification. His main focus is on warrant, which he defines as “a ‘proper’ response to a perceptual representation” (p. 142). As many of these essays consist in attempts to rehash and improve arguments expressed in earlier works, those previously unfamiliar with Audi’s intuitionism and critiques are advised to begin with Audi’s The Good and the Right (2004) and Timmons, Greco & Mele’s Rationality and the Good (2007) and only then proceed to The New Intuitionism for refinements. On the other hand, the essays in this volume are relatively brief and light in footnotes, which may be an advantage for those seeking philosophical stimulation rather than detailed argumentation. Space will only permit comments on two of the articles. Sinnott-Armstrong’s essay stands in line with three long lasting agendas of his: (1) defending coherentism; (2) demonstrating that empirical moral psychology has significant metaethical implications; and (3) defending moral skepticism. According to moral intuitionists, moral beliefs can be non-inferentially justified. So, for example, my belief that “shooting you just for fun is wrong”, need not rely on any inference from premises in order to be justified, that it just seems obviously true will suffice for epistemic justification (so long as defeaters are lacking). Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is a critique of this claim. In light of empirical data regarding moral beliefs, he argues that if intuitive beliefs are to be justified, their justification must involve an inference. Why? Moral inter- and intra-personal disagreement is widespread. People judge identical cases differently. Factors such as emotions, level of sleep deprivation, personal bias, hypnosis and priming of various sorts have proven to affect moral judgment. Since inconsistent beliefs cannot jointly be true, false moral intuitions are evidently prevalent. Next, if one knows that a belief belongs to a class of beliefs that is proven unreliable, one loses one’s epistemic justification for that belief unless one can show that it belongs to a narrower class of beliefs that can still justifiably be considered reliable. Therefore, an informed adult will be justified in relying on his moral intuitions only in instances that he or she can justifiably believe belong to a special subclass in which falsity is less pervasive. However, such a move will rely on an inference. Thus, the move from moral intuition to justified moral belief cannot be made without relying on an inference, and we cannot have justified moral non-inferential beliefs. Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is thought provoking and no doubt a welcome contribution to the ongoing debate. It is a virtue of Sinnott-Armstrong that after rejecting three objections, he admits that the conversation does not end here, as there are other possible objections that he will have to address (p. 28). In what follows I will gesture at some such objections, though I cannot fully explore their success here. First, intuitionists may argue that moral disagreement, though common, is not pervasive enough to show intuitions to be totally unreliable. Sinnott-Armstong admits that he “still cannot specify a precise percentage of moral beliefs that are not true; and the numbers do matter”, but he thinks that the current state of research should be troubling enough to motivate his argument. The intuitionist, while conceding that the empirical data is troubling, may argue that it is not devastatingly so. Intuitionists will likely emphasize that moral disagreement is much less pervasive when considering simple cases, such as harming an innocent person or not keeping a promise just for fun. Alternatively, intuitionists may argue that some beliefs can be at least pragmatically justified even if their estimated accuracy is low. Such a Jamesian (1979) approach to justification of beliefs is nicely illustrated by an example: suppose you know that your navigational skills are generally unreliable. Nevertheless, if you are stuck alone in a desert, you will have no choice but to rely on your apparently unreliable navigational judgments. (The example is a variant of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification of induction, discussed in Littlejohn’s essay in the current volume (p. 123) who draws from (Enoch & Schechter, 2008)). Likewise, perhaps empirical studies prove our moral judgment to be low in accuracy, but we have no good alternative to using our judgment when deciding what we ought to do and are therefore still justified in forming our moral beliefs the way we do. Sinnott-Armstong is correct that morality is extremely important and that therefore “it is unwise or even unreasonable to take big chances with moral beliefs” (p. 21), but do we have a relevant alternative? Everyday life demands of us practical responses to circumstances of great moral consequences; suspension of action is not a live option. To the extent that suspension of belief leads to suspension of action, the situation is often even worse, as suspension of action is often not morally neutral. In fact, in many instances non-action can be outright immoral. Going back to the analogy, while stuck alone in a desert, staying put is not a reasonable option. Third, there are problems with grouping beliefs into classes of beliefs. But, depending on how classes of beliefs are individuated, any particular belief, moral beliefs included, can belong to an infinite number of classes, some of which one will be justified and others unjustified in presuming to be reliable. So, for instance, the class of my mature beliefs, moral beliefs included, formed when I was not tired, under hypnosis or drugs, biased and the like, will most likely include much less inconsistency than needed to justify the negative presumption that sets off the argument. A principled reason to include a given moral belief in one class of beliefs rather than another is not provided. Perhaps it can be argued that beliefs can be principally grouped by their methods of formation and justification, and that moral beliefs in general have in common a unique method. It is not obvious that a unique moral belief forming method can be non-arbitrarily individuated; Sinnott-Armstrong will have some work to do to show that it can. Finally, suppose this process is in some sense inferential. Must the need for an inference always be a problem for intuitionists? Audi emphasizes that a belief can be both non-inferentially justified and gain additional inferential justification. Thus, finding an inference in the line of justification need not imply that the belief is inferential in any problematic manner. But this remark of Audi’s is insufficient, as Sinnott-Armstrong is not merely arguing that an inference can convey additional justification, rather he argues that moral beliefs cannot be justified without relying on an inference. It seems to me that Audi should go one step further and argue that even so, not every need of inference will harm the essential tenants of a moderate intuitionism. Whether a need for an inference is harmful can only be determined after specifying what it is in the first place that motivates intuitionists to claim for moral beliefs non-inferential status. Sinnott-Armstrong emphasizes that intuitionists posit non-inferential beliefs in order to avoid an infinite skeptical regress (p. 13-14). Coherentists, such as Sinnott-Armstrong, think that circular inferential structures of justification can confer justification when taken whole-sale, but foundationalists, such as Audi, are motivated by the intuition that the regress can only be stopped by justified non-inferential beliefs. If this is the problem with inferential justification, whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is harmful will depend on whether the inference needed relies on premises that cannot be non-inferentially justified. Admittedly, the details need to be worked out, but Sinnott-Armstrong has not shown that the process cannot terminate in non-inferential justified beliefs. Perhaps inferences from non-inferentially-justified beliefs will suffice to show a subclass of moral intuitions (formed when one is not tired, hypnotized, biased etc.) in which falsity has not been shown to prevail. It is natural to discuss Clayton Littlejohn’s essay after Sinnott-Armstrong’s, since two of Littlejohn’s rebuttals are of arguments presented by Sinnott-Armstrong in earlier works. The first of these, the only one I will be commenting on here, is an earlier version of the very argument that Sinnott-Armstrong tries to amend in the current volume, though Littlejohn seems unaware of the revised argument. Sinnott-Armstrong’s previous version used the same empirical data to argue that “moral intuitions are unreliable to the extent that morally irrelevant factors affect moral intuitions” (p. 108). (I note that there may be a problem here, since assessing which factors are morally irrelevant will itself rely on moral intuitions. Perhaps this is why Sinnott-Armstrong reformulated the argument so that its current presentation does not require the ability to discern the moral relevance of underlying factors affecting moral intuitions. Littlejohn does not address this issue, perhaps justly so, since as long as the moral intuitionist has the intuition that those factors are morally irrelevant, moral intuitions will have been shown to be incoherent). In response, Littlejohn argues that Sinnott-Armstong’s argument would at most imply that moral knowledge and justification are unattainable “as a matter of contingent fact” rather than necessary fact. This response is unsatisfying. Contingent or not, if as a matter of fact moral knowledge and moral justification are unattainable in our world, isn’t that bad enough? Littlejohn further argues that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument will at most apply to those aware of the empirical data, and not to common folk. Indeed, in the current volume Sinnott-Armstrong has amended his argument so that the claim is “only” that it applies to knowledgeable adults aware of this data. Again one wonders, isn’t it bad enough if us readers who are now aware of the data have lost our justification for our moral beliefs, even if some ignorant folk remain in some sense justified? Littlejohn’s conclusion that “We’ve not seen any compelling reason to deny that our moral beliefs can constitute knowledge” has not been substantiated as far as the first argument is concerned. * Many thanks to Gilad Be’eri, Brian Besong, David Enoch and Jerome Gellman for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this review. Dan Baras is currently working on a PhD in philosophy at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. References Audi, R. (2004). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (p. 256). Princeton University Press. Crisp, R. (2007). Intuitionism and Disagreement. In M. Timmons, J. Greco, & A. R. Mele (Eds.), Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi (pp. 31–39). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Enoch, D., & Schechter, J. (2008). How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(3), 547–579. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00157.x James, W. (1979). The Will to Believe. In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Harvard University Press. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2006). Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology. In T. Horgan & M. Timmons (Eds.), Metaethics After Moore (pp. 339–365). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016 Timmons, M., Greco, J., & Mele, A. R. (Eds.). (2007). Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi (p. 288). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.001.0001 4