Abstract
This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.
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Notes
While the labels ‘distributed cognition’ (Hutchins 1995, 2010a) and ‘extended cognition’ are often used interchangeably, we try to use the former for a broader range of approaches which stress the methodological importance of studying rich interactions across heterogeneous resources, more than metaphysical claims about the location and constitution of cognition. Although our goal here is to articulate and defend the more modest claims of the distributed cognition framework, understood in this way, rather than the more ambitious metaphysics of extended cognition, we believe the two approaches are entirely compatible.
The literature on extended cognition in philosophy alone is now extensive and multifaceted, and we don’t try to deal with many issues central to the current debate. Further, in discussing critics of extended cognition we focus here primarily on Adams and Aizawa’s work. On some points, Robert Rupert’s distinct critical analyses (2004, 2009) require different responses: although we believe that the current argument can also begin to ground such responses to Rupert, we keep a full treatment for another occasion. In particular, Rupert offers a more fully developed vision of the form and content of a view of cognition as embedded but not extended (2009, chapters 9-11). Although we’ll argue, like Rupert, that the positive contributions of novel approaches in philosophy of cognition and in cognitive science itself can be acknowledged without jettisoning either computationalism or the representational theory of mind, we disagree with his view that no ‘philosophically significant’ departures from orthodoxy are required to develop and apply a rich enough, thoroughly embedded vision in cognitive scientific practice (2009, p.193). But while our current treatment of memory is intended to exemplify this claim, we postpone a direct response to another occasion.
We will be happy if the parity principle (Clark and Chalmers 1998) can subsequently be reconstructed, freed of what Clark identifies as “persistent misreading” (2008, p. 114), in a form that renders it fully compatible with complementarity (Wheeler 2010a, b). But complementarity takes precedence: we note that when parity is under pressure Clark often rightly resorts to considering larger hybrids such as “Otto-and-the-notebook” as “a single, integrated system” (2005a, p. 7), which in our terms is precisely to shift to complementarity.
Although that paper ‘Exograms and Interdisciplinarity’ was published only in 2010, its core ideas were presented at the Extended Mind conference, University of Hertfordshire 2001: the paper circulated in draft from 2005, and critical responses to that draft are discussed below.
Sutton (2010) also argues that complementarity considerations clearly allow—again, contrary to the vision of extended cognition assumed by some critics, such as Grush (2003)—that both the brain and the persisting organism play special roles in extended cognitive systems. This means both that cognitive neuroscience retains its central status in the sciences of the mind, and that the study of differences in the stable characteristics of persisting individuals remains crucial as we seek to understand distinctive patterns of and potentials for coupling, decoupling, and recoupling. As we argue below, these are not concessions signaling a conservative strand of the extended cognition movement, but more precise pinpointing of the framework’s real force. That paper also argues, against critics like Butler (1998, p. 222) and Adams and Aizawa (2001, p. 58), that interdisciplinary study of the unique properties of historically and culturally diverse artifacts is not just compatible with but required by extended cognition, properly understood.
Rupert’s treatment of complementarity considerations (2009, pp. 112 and 118–130) focuses instead on the case of language as a putative cognitive artifact.
Compare Adams and Aizawa (2010): ‘the discovery of complementarity is a peculiar basis upon which to argue for extended cognition’.
We do not have space to discuss the distinction Adams and Aizawa draw here, or the fact that they accept extended cognitive systems (2008, pp. 106–132).
We do not believe that arguments from parity are intended to deny the possibility of intracranial cognition either, but for current purposes again we focus only on arguments from complementarity.
In the case of our own specific research program, furthermore, our interdisciplinary research is (as we show below) explicitly set within the cognitive psychology of memory, seeking to employ and expand its best theories and methods.
For attempts to distinguish representationalist versions of extended mind theses from more extreme anti-cognitivist versions, see Sutton 2008b; Wheeler 2010c. There remain of course substantial residual questions about what representations might be within a distributed cognition framework (Chemero 2009; Steiner 2010). Anti-representationalism is not, however, the only direction by which extended cognition might be further radicalized. On the one hand, we will seek analyses which directly relate neural and worldly processes, or the subpersonal and the social, refiguring our understanding of brain dynamics too as arising from interanimating mechanisms of coordination which pay no heed to the location of the resources recruited (Clark 2008; Rowlands 2010). On the other hand, we will seek to tie the approach to social memory developed here back, in richer experimental ethnographies, to the study of artifacts and places, and of the routines and skilful practices by which individuals and groups actively integrate such disparate resources (see Sutton 2008a, b, 2010, p. 213 for initial remarks on a distinct “third wave” in extended cognition).
Likewise, we are surprised at Adams and Aizawa’s (in press) claim that Clark shies away from or rejects cognitivism, where this is understood as the view that cognition “involves certain sorts of manipulations of non-derived representations.” Clark not only accepts cognitivism as a general thesis, but specifically is willing to grant Adams and Aizawa that cognition involves manipulations of non-derived representations, while arguing that it also often involves manipulations of derived representations as well (Clark 2010b, c, d).
Likewise, in other remarks on complementarity, Adams and Aizawa note that once we acknowledge that the interacting components of extended cognitive systems operate on distinct principles, we will then “naturally want to know what the brain contributes and what principles it is governed by.” Again, we agree. They then suggest that “the complementarity arguments for extended cognition lead back to the view that one should take very seriously the standard view that there are intracranial cognitive processes” (2008, p. 176). We find this particularly unclear. We all agree that complementarity is compatible with the existence of intracranial cognition, so this cannot be Adams and Aizawa’s point. They intend, we think, a stronger and more individualistic form of the “standard view”: not just ‘that there are intracranial cognitive processes’ but that there are only ever intracranial cognitive processes. This is suggested by their comment that complementarity considerations open the door to “the hypothesis that there exist distinct kinds of processes plausibly described as cognitive that take place only within the brain” (2008, pp. 175–176). This is Adams and Aizawa’s dilemma in operation again: either complementarity is an implausibly radical form of anti-cognitivism, or else it reverts to an individualist kind of “standard view”. We respond to the second horn of this dilemma in the next section below, arguing again that these are not the only available options.
Margaret Boden’s extraordinary history of the cognitive sciences (2006) shows how often grand and revolutionary rhetoric in fact coexists with, and occasionally helps to drive, what later looks clearly to have been specialist and incremental change.
Compare Margaret Wilson’s deflationary treatment of distributed cognition (2002, p.631). She too sets up and criticizes an extreme “strong view of distributed cognition” as the idea “that a cognitive system cannot in principle be taken to comprise only an individual mind” (our emphasis), and goes on to recommend an opposing conservative position, that the study of the situation instead be considered as merely “a promising supplementary avenue of investigation,” when “the idea of distributed cognition loses much of its radical cache.”
We offer these labels for the three options for ease of reference, but we do not place too much weight on the specific labels: in particular, as we note below, the label “embedded cognition” as used elsewhere in the literature often fails to distinguish between options #2 and #3. We use the label “scaffolded cognition” roughly as suggested by Sterelny (this issue), on which more below.
The context of this passage is revealing. Adams and Aizawa ask extended cognition theorists: “Why make a radical break from orthodoxy? Why seek a revolutionary scientific approach, one that overthrows the orthodox view of what cognition is and where it is to be found? Why not aim for a scientific and philosophical contribution that is empirically plausible and interesting?” (2008, p. 177). Such a contribution is precisely what we seek in the case of memory: but it requires much more detailed and systematic investigations of richer and more enduring causal interactions or couplings between brain, body, and world than are countenanced by Adams and Aizawa.
In other words, we interpret Sprevak here as confirming that there are deep and important differences, with consequences for cognitive scientific practice, between option #2 (the merely embedded individualist internalism of Adams and Aizawa) and option #3, but fewer practical and explanatory differences between option #1 and option #3. Once the focus really is on profoundly interactive systems of intricately coordinated but radically heterogeneous resources, then perhaps the metaphysical difference between genuinely embedded cognition (our “scaffolded cognition”, option #3 above) and extended cognition (option #1) will have “vanishingly little traction on the day-to-day work of cognitive science” (Sprevak 2009, p. 527; compare Barker 2010).
Our strategy for the case of memory is thus precisely parallel to that of Griffiths and Scarantino in developing what they call a “situationist perspective” on emotion, which “does not require denying the results produced by other theoretical traditions in psychology… [but] shifts our theoretical focus to neglected phenomena and questions” (2009, p. 438).
External and conventional cognitive resources with complex cultural histories—from simple mnemonics and specific forms of imagery to the heavily crafted medieval arts of memory or specialist forms of scientific thinking—are often subsequently internalized so successfully that they need not still exist in the agent’s current physical environment to have their transformative effect. If location really is not the important issue, then resources can be extended in the relevant explanatory sense even when they are not literally external (Clark 2005b; Sutton 2010, pp. 207–213).
We are not quite sure how to interpret Sterelny’s discussion of this point (Sterelny 2010). He criticises extended mind theorists for rarely treating other agents as part of an extended mind. As Sterelny notes, other agents can be “reliably and easily available, routinely used, substituting for imperfect memory and trusted by default”: he gives the example of mothers’ cognitive roles for their young children. But he goes on to suggest that in fact other agents “resist individualisation”. It is true that parents do have other functions, and in general people do not possess each other entirely in the way that chefs or batters might guard their treasured artifacts. Yet in some contexts, social niches are at least as stable as relations between individuals and specific objects. Remembering that these are all matters of degree, we might query Sterelny’s assertion that “I cannot adapt [other agents’] minds to my purposes, not in a permanent, sustained and reliable way”: though incomplete and fallible, this mutual adaptation is precisely what occurs in some significant degree both in long-term relationships of various kinds and in parent–child interaction. Five-year olds do, to some extent, contra Sterelny, individualise their mother, even if in a more mutual and bidirectional fashion than the way Otto may have designed his notebook. Our studies of transactive memory in older couples (see below) pursue related themes in empirical contexts.
We are tempted to subsume this ‘interchangeable-or-individualised’ dimension under the dimension of ease or difficulty of use. The questions of whether or not a specific artifact can be successfully transferred to another agent, and whether or not one user can adapt to numerically different but similar artifacts, are often less pressing than the slightly different question of how hard it is for an agent to use an artifact no matter what its provenance. In other words, we see this as an issue about the meeting of the more or less skilful agent with equipment which, relative to that agent, is more or less transparent in use. This focus on skill and expertise is entirely compatible with Sterelny’s broader perspective, and highlights vital but undernoticed questions in the scaffolded and extended mind literature about the proceduralization of our interaction with external resources: artifacts which require ungainly struggles to deploy will not qualify, and the process by which they gradually become “transparent equipment with which you confront the wider world” (Clark 2008, p. 72) requires more attention. For a brilliant integration of extended mind themes with the phenomenology of absorbed coping see Wheeler 2005; see also Sutton 2007 on embodied skill.
These diachronic aspects of some collective cognitive activity—concerning its origin and adaptation, and the transmission of the relevant skills over time—have also been underdiscussed in the philosophical literature, which has tended to focus on active occurrent external interactions. Biological, anthropological, and linguistic studies of scaffolded and distributed cognition again have much to offer here (Kirsh 2010).
Nonetheless, like Wilson and Clark, who also set fully extended cognition within a broader framework as those cases in which external resources are highly reliable and highly durable, we suggest that these regions of Sterelny’s space are of considerable interest both in their own right and in pointing up their differences from less extended cases. We do not particularly care about either ‘reserving a special label [“extended”] for this region of space’ or marking any non-arbitrary line between it and other forms of scaffolded mind (Sterelny 2010): if this is to give up on revolution, so be it, but we can still get on with the interesting work of characterizing the phenomena of this region among others. For those who engage genuinely over time in that difficult work, however, we suspect that use of that extra label of “extended cognition” for such stronger cases of enduringly interactive coupling will come to seem less of an outrageous denial of all that’s good and true in current science, and more of a catchy reminder that “where ongoing human cognitive activity is concerned, there are usually many boundaries in play, many different kinds of capacity and resource in action, and a complex and somewhat anarchic flux of recruitment, retrieval, and processing defined across these shifting, heterogeneous, multifaceted wholes” (Clark 2008, p. 138).
In response to Hutchins’ (2010c) statement of a similar point, Clark acknowledges his “prolonged and continuing neglect of the massive social and cultural dimensions that shape and enable our actual cognitive practices” (2010a). The guilt is somewhat overstated: in other strands of his work Clark has provided rich and suggestive ingredients towards an original analysis of these dimensions: building in part on his earlier work on moral cognition (1996), Clark has for example showed how collaboratively devised maxims, normative policies, and shared strategies combine iteratively into cascades of distributed cognitive architectures, as we transform our own linguistic, educational, physical, affective, and institutional environments so as to open up entirely new spaces and possibilities for thinking, feeling, and acting together (2002b, 2005b, c, 2006a, b; compare Sutton 2010, p. 211). Nonetheless, Hutchins’ point that Clark does not naturally think first of socio-cultural contexts and practices when seeking to understand the sources of organization and coordination of distributed cognitive assemblies does ring true.
Although there is also a cognitive psychology of mnemonic artifact interaction, such as Habermas and Paha’s (2002) research on the mnemonic role of souvenirs at points of life transition or Jones and Martin’s (2006) empirical studies of “mnemoactive objects”, that topic has been addressed more extensively in cognitive anthropology and in material culture studies, while cognitive psychologists have more often studied social memory processes (Ross et al. 2008a). In many cases, of course, a relatively stable socio-cognitive system in a relatively stable niche crucially involves interaction with artifacts. When we are considering putative socially distributed cognition in contrast to Otto’s notebook, however, the relevant external resources are clearly highly dynamic and active.
So our interest lies in particular in similar or shared autobiographical memories, which are among the most puzzling of the many phenomena of social memory. Other cognitive psychologists study the social aspects and analogues of semantic or procedural memory. Unlike some radical critics of individualist cognitive science (Toth and Hunt 1999; Danziger 2008), we are entirely happy to work outward from the basis of the established taxonomy of individual memory (Sutton 2003), while acknowledging that there’s no definitive consensus on the criteria for individuating putative “memory systems”, and while we stress their interactivity in practice.
Memory also affords us more secure conceptions of the domain, in both common sense and scientific psychology, than we have for the general notions of ‘mind’ and ‘cognition’. The concepts of ‘cognition’ and ‘mind’ have suspect and fluid histories and are subject to considerable cross-linguistic variation (Macdonald 2003; Wierzbicka 1992). Most importantly, they play less of a live role in the daily activities of scientific psychologists than do concepts like memory, emotion, and vision, or even decision-making, imagining, and dreaming. This is in itself no objection to the general idea of a quest for a unifying ‘mark of the cognitive’ to specify what all these different processes and capacities might have in common (Adams 2010), but simply a cautionary note that staying closer to scientific practice might mandate a less abstract scope. Likewise, we have no principled objection to the quest for a unifying ‘mark of memory’, for what makes some processes and not others memory processes, and we acknowledge the need to respond to Robert Rupert’s complaint (2004) that the notion of memory with which we operate is overly generic: in this paper, however, we are concerned to demonstrate that theorizing and experimenting on socially distributed remembering is an entirely pervasive activity in mainstream cognitive psychology.
Rupert’s (2004) use of results from the cognitive psychology of memory to challenge extended cognition has other features which demand separate treatment on another occasion. Although Rupert discusses some additional topics, including interference effects, memory in conversation, and the notion of long-term working memory, however, he too neglects the sorts of mainstream work on both autobiographical memory and collaborative recall on which we focus here. In distinct strands of his argument, Rupert suggests firstly that empirical results demonstrate significant ‘mismatch between memory as we know it in the standard case and what is alleged to be extended memory’ (2004, p.410), and then that there is more unity to and explanatory utility in the variety of internal memory systems than there would be in any coarse-grained notion of ‘generic memory’ that covered larger hybrid systems (pp. 418–421). Our response to Adams and Aizawa is relevant primarily to the first strand of Rupert’s argument: we will discuss the second strand elsewhere alongside a response to Rupert’s broader critique of social ontology (Rupert 2005).
In addition, though, there is indeed a group or socially distributed generation effect—see the discussion below of our work in collaborative recall. We also note here the tension between Adams and Aizawa’s wish to respect cognitive scientific practice and their scepticism about a notion of memory even sufficiently general to cover canine memory and mollusk memory as well as human memory (2008, p. 141). There are all kinds of live issues about which forms of memory are found in which non-human animals, but we suspect that neither neuroscientists nor cognitive ethologists will stop thinking they study memory if it should turn out that sea slugs, mice, chimpanzees, or scrub jays do not exhibit the generation effect. See also Clark, in press.
They are the equivalent, in the case of memory research, of the examples which Adams and Aizawa cite, as mentioned above, to show that cognitive psychologists do attend to “environmental and bodily processes”: they ask “How could one understand why a person’s eyes dilate at a given time, if one does not know that she is playing Texas Hold ‘em and has just drawn the top full house? How could one understand why a person is thinking about a bandage without knowing that the person cut her finger with a knife?’ (2008, p. 111). These are not cases of coupling at all, but of simple causal interaction.
Tulving and Thomson offer an intriguing historical glimpse at what, in 1973, they called ‘the current transition from traditional associationism to information processing and organizational points of view about human memory’, the impact as we’d now see it of the ‘New Look’ psychology on memory research. They contrast their interactionist account of retrieval, by which we must consider both relations between the contexts of encoding and of retrieval and relations between agent and environment, with the earlier verbal learning tradition in which ‘memory was still a matter of acquisition, retention, transfer, and interference of associations between stimuli and responses’ (1973, p.352). Adams and Aizawa’s picture of the psychology of memory, in contrast, is in the main drawn from research originally undertaken before the cognitive revolution.
French et al. (2008), for example, showed slightly different versions of a film to two people who think they are watching the same film. After discussion about the film’s key incidents, some individuals’ memory comes to incorporate elements of what the other person saw and mentioned. Couples were more likely to “yield” to each other’s version of events, possibly because they trusted each other’s access to a putatively shared reality: people are thus, French et al. concluded, “even more susceptible to memory distortion when someone they know provides the misleading information” (2008, p.271).
Indeed in the mainstream CR literature, even the standard ways to diminish collaborative inhibition have minimized interactivity, seeking to allow individuals more chance to adopt and implement their own distinct retrieval strategies, for example by requiring strict turn-taking in the group recall rather than allowing a free-flowing interactive discussion. This all but eliminates in advance any possibility of emergent socially distributed memory (Barnier et al. 2008; Harris 2009). So while the claim we cited above by Sprevak (2010) that externalism has already won in cognitive psychology is thus dramatically premature, there are here as in many domains a range of live options about explanatory scope and method, as well as about the interpretation of empirical results, which both reflect and can feed back in to more informed attitudes about embedded and extended memory and cognition.
See also the highly original ethnographic study by Wu et al. (2008), explicitly inspired by Hutchins’ distributed cognition framework, of the coordination of social and technological supports for people with amnesia, who are liable to get lost or forget key appointments or actions. This work is notable not only for its effective critique of existing literature on and technologies for cognitive rehabilitation, which focus on individual independence and neglect the extraordinary interpersonal efforts by which families cope with memory impairments, but also for its specific examination of differently balanced practical solutions, across different families, to the dynamic management of redundancy and information-distribution in situations of substantial and stressful memory volatility.
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Acknowledgements
The research was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Project grant DP0770271 to Amanda Barnier and John Sutton and an ARC Australian Research Fellowship to Amanda Barnier: we are grateful for that support. Special thanks to Richard Menary for running another excellent workshop on these themes and for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to our collaborators on various parts of the framework developed here, notably Lucas Bietti, Wayne Christensen, Andy Clark, Roger Dixon, Greg Downey, Andrew Geeves, Bill Hirst, Doris McIlwain, Lars Marstaller, Anne Monchamp, Suparna Rajaram, Charlie Stone, Evelyn Tribble, Kellie Williamson, Rob Wilson, and Carl Windhorst. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Wollongong workshop “Embodied Cognition, Enactivism, and the Extended Mind” in December 2009 and at the annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy at UNSW in July 2010. Our thanks to Annette Baier, Paul Griffiths, Jenann Ismael, Philip Pettit, Kim Sterelny, and everyone else who offered us feedback on those occasions.
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Sutton, J., Harris, C.B., Keil, P.G. et al. The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering. Phenom Cogn Sci 9, 521–560 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9182-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9182-y