Abstract
This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple “environments” in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call “Frameworks.” The pluralistic aspect allows that these stable elements, while constraining representational and linguistic schemes, do not define a single framework for truthmaking relations. We strengthen this position by considering themes on situated rational agency from cognitive science and artificial intelligence, arguing that whatever enables or supports rational action within a particular environment must figure into some account of truth and truthmaking, and vice versa.
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Baç, M., Elio, R. Scheme-Based Alethic Realism: Agency, the Environment, and Truthmaking. Minds and Machines 14, 173–196 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MIND.0000021705.36572.0f
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MIND.0000021705.36572.0f