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Completeness in the theory of properties, relations, and propositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

George Bealer*
Affiliation:
Reed College, PortlandOregon 97202

Extract

Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity. There is, however, a first-order theory of PRPs that results when standard first-order logic is supplemented with an operation of intensional abstraction. It turns out that this first-order theory of PRPs is provably complete with respect to its standard notions of validity. The construction involves the development of a new algebraic semantic method. Unlike most other methods used in contemporary intensional logic, this method does not appeal to possible worlds as a heuristic; the heuristic used is that of PRPs taken as primitive entities. This is important, for even though the possible-worlds approach is useful in treating modal logic, it seems to be of little help in treating the logic for psychological matters. The present approach, by contrast, appears to make a step in the direction of a satisfactory treatment of both modal and intentional logic. For, by taking PRPs as primitive entities, we remain free to tailor the statement of their identity conditions so that it agrees with the logical data—modal, psychological, etc. In this way, the present approach suggests a strategy for developing a comprehensive treatment of intensional logic.

In [1] and [2] I explore this prospect philosophically. The purpose of the present paper is to lay out the technical details of the approach and to present the completeness results.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1983

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References

REFERENCES

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