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JC Beall, Existential Claims and Platonism, Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 9, Issue 1, February 2001, Pages 80–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/9.1.80
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Abstract
This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails.
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